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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
1. Where a "contract is assigned in full payment and satisfaction of a uote,
it is immaterial how much is due on the contract. Luke v. J'ohnnyeake, 529.
2. Payment of part of a debt in accord and satisfaction of the whole debt
is no liquidation, and an agreement to receive it as such is nudum pactum
Bliss v. Shwarts, 592.
3. Part payment of a debt, concededly due, though agreed to be taken as
full payment, is no accord and satisfaction. Howard et al. v. Norton, 656.
4. But if the amount of the debt is disputed it is. Id.
5. So is the note of a third party, or property other than money received
as satisfaction. .d.
ACCOUNT. See PARTNERStIP, 3. TtESPASS, 5
ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 15, 16.
ACTION. See DAM. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 4.
1. The confidence induced by undertaking any service for another, is a
sufficient legal consideration to create a duty in the performance of it. Ham.
mond v. Hussey, 114.
2. The defendant, being the teacher of a high school, undertook, at the
request of the school committee, to examine candidates for admission to said
school as scholars therein, and truthfully to report to the committee concern-
ing their qualifications. The plaintiff submitted himself to such examination
and was found properly qualified ; but the defendant maliciously, deceitfully
and falsely reported to the committee that the plaintiff was not so qualified ;
by reason whereof the plaintiff was excluded from the high school and de-
prived of its benefits. Held, that the plaintiff might maintain an action on
the case against the teacher to recover his damages, occasioned by reason of
such false and malicious report. Id.
3. Under some circumstances the creditor of an estate may maintain an
action against a debtor of the estate, to collect his debt. Fisher et al. v.
Hubbell et al., 726.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1790, May 26. ' See COURTS, 3.
1866, July 13. See INTERNAL REVENUE, 3.
1869, March 2. See BANKRUPTCY, 24.
1870, July 14. See STAMr, 4.
1871, Feb'y 28. See NEGLIGENCE, 5.
1871, April 20. See COURTS, 9.
ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR.
ADMIRALTY. See MECHANICS AND MATERIAL-MEN, 3, 7.
1. It is no defence to a proceeding in rein against a steamship, for tortious
collision, that a pilot was in charge conformably to the state law. Y7 7a
MAerrimac, 185.
2. The master, officers and crew having voluntarily left a vessel she will
be deemed a derelict. The Laura, 186.
3. A vessel attempting to save a derelict will not be responsible for the lat-
ter's loss. .d.
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4. A steamer meeting a vessel on the high seas at night, is entitled to
presume she is such a vessel as her light indicates. The Scotia, 186.
5. The people of other nations, navigating the high seas, may sue th
citizens of tile United States in her courts, for injuries resulting from disre-
gard of the navigation laws. Id.
6. Courts may take judicial notice of the, rules of navigation of Great
Britain and the United States. I.
7. The District Court as a court of admiralty has jurisdiction of a caus-.
wherein the libellant seeks to recover damages caused to his vessel by a pier
erected by the respondent without legal authority within the navigable chan-
nel of the Mississippi river. IN. IF. Packet Co. v. Atlee, 561.
ADULTERY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 21.
ADVANCEMENT. See DECEDENT'S ESTATE, 3. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 13.
A mere oral declaration by a father, that he will not collect a loan from
his son, but let him have it at his death, does not make an advancement.
Denman v. MJifalhdn, 529.
AGENT. See BOND, 4. EVIDENCE, 23.
1. Tie declarations of an agent are not per se evidence of agency. Na-
tional Mechanics' Bank v. National Bank of Baltimore, 51.
2. The agency being established the declarations are admissible to bind the
principal. Id.
3. It is not the province of the court to determine the question of agency.
Id.
4. An agent employed to let premises and collect rents cannot consent to
the substitution of a new tenant. Wilson v. Lester et al. 593.
5. An action for the proceeds of property sold by one agent by orders of
another, can be maintained by the owner against the seller. Evans v. 11ra7n,
728.
6. Where a city is the vendor of water to her citizens, the officers in charge
of the waterworks and the city, stand in the relation of principal and agent,
and the city is liable for their negligence and irregularities. City of Phila'
delphia v. &ilmartin, 791.
AGREEMENT. See CONTRACT, 9. COVENANT, 9.
ALIMONY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 4, 9, 10.
ALLEY. See HIGHWAY, 9.
AMENDMENT.
1. An amendment, to secure an advantage unjustly obtained, will not be
tolerated. For','ian v. Scott, 52.
2. In the fu,herancc of justice the law looks leniently on mistakes, ,f
honestly naide. Id.
3. A summons irregularly served cannot be amended after judgment, otlir-
wise where tlre is only a defect in the return. Id.
4. A declaration for goods sold and delivered, may be amended by a court
for goods bargained and sold without changing the form of action. Jenness
et al. v. 11'endell, 57.
5. An amendment of process will le presumed to haVe been made on the
last day of term. Burns v. National Bank of St. Albans, 398.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS. See PARTNERSHIP, 28.
ARBITRATION.
An award may be recommitted to the referee for the correction of a clerical
error, and judgment entered on it when corrected. Yeaton v. Brown, 529
ASSIGNEE. See BANKRUPTCY, III.
ASSIGNMENT. See BILLS AND NOTES, 5. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, I.
ASSAULT. See CRIMINAL LAW, If.
The idea embraced in the expression that a man's house is his castle, is not
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that it is his property, and that, as such, he has the right to defend and pro-tect it by other and more extreme means than he might lawfully use to de-fend and protect his shop, his office or his barn. The sense in which thehouse has a peculiar immunity, is that it is sacred for the protection of hisperson and of his family. An assault on the house can be regarded as anassault on the person only in case the purpose of snch assault be injury tothe person of the occupant, or members of his family, and in order to accom-plish this, the assailant attacks the castle in order to reach the inmate. IVthis view it is settled that, in such case, the inmate need not flee from hishouse in order to escape injury by the assailant, but he may meet him at thethreshold, and prevent him from breaking in by any means rendered neces-sary by the exigency ; and upon the same ground and reason that one maydefend himself from peril of life, or great bodily harm, by means fatal tothe assailant, if rendered necessary by the exigency of the assault. State v.
Patterson, 647.
ASSIGNMENT. See MORTGAGEl, 5..
1. A written order by a creditor requesting his debtor to pay to a thirdperson, is an equitable assignment which a court will enforce. Conwayl v.
Cutting, 254.
2. No particular form of words is necessary to the validity of such an as-
signment. rd.
3. A claim for money tortiously obtained from a party may be assigned soas to give assignee a right to recover in his own name. Stewart v. Balder-
son, 727.
ASSUM ISIT. See PARTNsERSHIP, 31, 33.
1. The mere signing of a petition by several creditors, to have a sequestra-tor appointed, is no evidence of a promise to pay the lawyer who presents
it. Cook v. Mackrdl, 398.
2. There is not necessarily an implied promise that the grantees will paythe amount specified in the deed as the consideration; circumstances may nega-
tive such implication. Belden v. Belden, 461.
3. For money had and received, will lie where a contract is rescinded, to
recover the money paid under it. Manahan v. Noyes, 671.
4. Contracts with nurses, housekeepers, &c., sought to be enforced afterthe death of the person to whom services are rendered, should be closelyscanned and not allowed without clear proof. Thompson v. Stevens, 727.5. A promise, that if plaintiff would stay with decedent as long as he livedhe would give her plenty after he was gone, so that she need not work, is
sufficiently definite. Id.
6. The measure of amount would be what would keep her without work,
taking into consideration her condition in life. Id.7. Where services are gratuitously rendered under expectation of a legacy,
there can be no contract. Id.
8. Where the declaration is on a parol contract and a written one is given
in evidence without objection, it will be held to be a waiver of the objectionthat the instrument was a specialty. Wolf Creek Coal Co. v. Shultz. 783.9. Such variance can be taken advantage of only when the evidence is
offered. Id.
& rTACHAIENT. See BANK1U1PTCY, 23. CONFEDERATE STATES, 3. SALE, 4.I. If the bond required by the Act of 1864, of Maryland, is not executedin conformity with the statute, prior to the issuing of an attachment, it is in-
valid, and the attachment illegal and void. Wannamaker v. Bowei, 61.2. In an action hy'a mortgagee against a creditor of the mortgagor for il-legally attaching the mortgaged goods, he cannot show that the mortgage i:fraudulent as to ,reditors, in defence of the action or mitigation of damages.
1a.
3. If the owner of goods, to prevent them from being attached as his own,
represent that they belong to another, and the party to whom the representa-
tion is made, relying, and from the circumstances having reason to rely, onthe representation as true, attach the goods for a debt due from the puirty, towhom it was represented that the goods belonged, in tr-ver for attaching the
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goods, the owner will not ],e permitted to show that his representation was
false, though at the time when he made it Ie had no notice of the debt on
which the goods were attached, and had no intention to deceive tile party who
attached them. Horn v. Cole, 303.
4. Where articles attached are too bulky to be taken into the manual pos-
session of the officer, his return mus: be so certain and explicit in the descrip-
tion and situation of the property, that subsequent purchasers can obtain sub
stantially the same notice as they would from actual possession, otherwise
tle attachment will not be valid. Bryant v. Osgood, 657.
5. An attachment of ten swarms of bees does not bind the hives. Ide v.
Fassett, 731.
ATTORNEY. See EVIDENCE, 27.
1. There is no reason why an attorney may not plead set-off to a suit b)
his client. Noble v. Learl, 530.
2. Attorneys in wioe hands a nortgage is placed by a bank for collection
acquire a lien thereon for services which is not defeated by the subsequent
appointment of a receiver. Bowling Green Savingb Bank v. Todd el al., 593.
3. An Act of the Legislature autlorizing the city of Louisville to compel
every attorney practising therein to pay a license of ten dollars per annum.
and subj cting them to a fine in case of refusal, is unconstitutional and void
as to attorneys admitted to practice befbre the passage of the Act. Louis-
ville v. Broon, 721.
4. An attorney and counsellor at law is vested with an official right which
cannot he trammelled in any way except for official and professional mliscon-
duct. id.
5. An attorney has no incidental power as such to pledge the credit of his
client by employing another attorney as assistant. Willard v. Danville, 727.
AUCTION. See FRAUDS OF STATUTE, 3.
AWARD. See ARBITRATION.
BAGGAGE. See EVIDENCE, 6.
BAILMENT. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 3.
1. The lender of a chattel, though not the owner, may bring a suit, for
damages happening while in the borrower's possession, and such suit may be
pleadcd in bar of one brought by the owner. Casey v. Stter, 52.
2. A township trustee is not a mere bailee of the tloney that comes into
his hands by virtue of his office. Rock et al. v. Stinger, 406.
3. The legal technical titi is in himself. Id.
BANK AND BANKER; See EVIDENCE, 24.
1 A national batk may be sued in any court in the county or city where
it is located. Bank of Bethel v. Palhquioque Baik, 125.
2. It does not lose its corporate existence by mere default in paying its
circulation. Id.
3. It'nay be sued though a receiver has been appointed. ]d.
4. The decision of the receiver upon the validity of a claim is not final. Id.
5. A mortgage made to the president of a bank to secure loans made by
the bank, the bank is the creditor of the mortgagee. Ripley v. ltarris, 467.
6. If a shareholder places part of his shares in the hands of a third person
to enable him to become at director, and lie does so for several years, lie will
be estopped from denying that lie is the actual owner as against a creditor
who trusted hin ou the faith of the shares. Young v. Vough el al., 467
7. A b--law declaring that no shares sball be transferred while the holder
is indebted, is audhorized by the Act of Congress and is a rea-onlble law. Id.
8. An endorser paying a note is subrorated to the rights of the bank. Id.
9. It is not ever- loan made in New York. by a foreign corporation, which
is prohibited by tile statute against unauthorized banking. llac;!.ttstown
National Bank v. .Rea, 600.
3ANKRUPTCY.
SUGOESTIONS OF AMENDMENTS TO THE BANKRUPT ACT, 737.
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L Ja-kdidtion. See post, 25.
1. A state court has no jurisdiction of a bill in equity filed by an ass-gnee
in bankruptcy, to set aside a conveyance made by a bankrupt, in fraud of the
act. Voorhees v. Frisbee, 108.
2. Courts of equity must have complete control over all the matters in
controversy, directly, or by coercion of the parties, and where this does not
exist, as in the case of an assignee, jurisdiction will be denied. Id.
3. In suits that can only be maintained under the Bankrupt Act, the United
States courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Id.
4. A man should not be adjudged bankrupt for non-payment of commercial
paper if he has reasonable ground for believing he is not liable on it. rn re
Munn, 461.
5. If he can satisfy the court that he has good reason to dispute, the court
should not entertain jurisdiction. .d.
I. Acts of Bankruptcy.
6. A judgment taken before June 1st 1867, is an unlawful preference under
the 35th sec., if taken after the enactment of the bankrupt law. Traders'
Bank v. Campbell, 119.
7. A defendant having money of bankrupt, delivered it to the sheriff who
levied defendant's execution on it and applied it in satisfaction. This con-
stitutes fraudulent preference. Id.
8. So is taking a check from bankrupt and crediting its amount on the
bankrupt's note, the day before taking judgment. Id.
9. The first clause of the 35th sect. of Bankrupt Act applies to a party
who has a claim against or is under liability for the bankrupt and receives
money by way of preference, the second to one who has no claim and is
under no liability, and purchases property of a bankrupt. Gibson v. Wardeyi,
119.
10. A transfer of firm property from one member of the firm to another.
is not an act of bankruptcy. In re Munn, 461.
11. Such a transfer is not a fraud upon creditors, nor does it constitute a
preference contrary to the act. .d.
III. Rights and Duties of Assignee. See COURT, 7. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR,
7.
12, The right of an assignee to recover a debt due the bankrupt prior to
the bankruptcy, does not depend upon the instrument of assignment. Zant-
zinger v. Ribble's Assignee, 52.
13. A copy of the assignment, certified under the seal of the court, is ad-
missible in evidence to prove the assignee's right to sue. Id.
14. Where the cause of action and judgment obtained by a bankrupt were
prior to the date of his assignment, the assignee will be entitled to an increase
of the judgment made by order of court, after such assignment. Id.
15. The signature of the judge is not essential to make an assignment
valid, if some equally formal mode is adopted sanctioned by the seal of
court. Id.
16. The proceeds of a sale of bankrupt's goods being in the hands of a
bank, the assignee may proceed against the bank, although the bank has given
the sheriff a certificate of deposit. Traders' Bank v. Campbell, 119.
17. An assignee claiming a fund as the bankrupt's property which was
transferred before the bankruptcy, must proceed under the 2d clause of the 3d
section. Smith v. Mason, 187.
18. An assignee in bankruptcy cannot interfere with the possession of goods
by the officer of a state court under an execution, or with the possession of
any person claiming either the absolute property or the right of possession to
enfbrce a lien. M31arshall v. Knox, 630.
19. Nor can such officer or person be brought within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Bankruptcy by summary process under rule to show cause. His
rights can only be adjudicated in a plenary suit at law or in equity for that
purpose. Id.
20. The attachments on mesne process which are dissolved by an adjudica-
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tion of bankruptcy are those which only become perfected liens by the judg-
ment which may ensue in them. Marshall v. Knox, 630.
21. A writ of provisional seizure for rent, in Louisiana, is in the nature of
an execution, and gives a lien on goods which is not discharged by a subse-
quent adjudication of bankruptcy of' the tenant. Id.
22. The sheriff under a writ of provisional seizure took a tenant's goods
into possession for rent. Tenant then filedia petition and was adjudged a
bankrupt. His assignee took a rule on the sheriff and the lessor to deliver
possession of the goods, and the Bankruptcy Court made the rule absolute,
and refused to allow an appeal. The lessor then filed a bill in the Circuit
Court, and after sale of the goods by the assignee, a supplemental bill, pray-
ing a review of the proceedings, ail accountand damages. Hield, That the
Bankruptcy Court had no jurisdiction to make the rule ; that this was an
original bill of which the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, and that an appeal
properly lay from the decree of the Circuit Court to this court. Id.
23. The measure of damages is tile full value of the goods and all the tax-
able costs of the litigation, the whole however not to exceed the an unt of
tent due. Id.
24. The property of a bankrupt in the hands of his assignee is not liable to
attachment under tl., laws of a state. Newman v. Fisher, 727.
25. Under the Ast of March 2d 1867, the District Courts of the United
States ha c exclusive jurisdiction. Id.
IV. Discharge.
26. A discharge under the Bankrupt Act of 1867, by a Bankruptcy Court
having jurisdiction, when properly pleaded in bar to a suit in a state court,
whether of law or equity, is conclusive, and cannot be attacked for fraud in
obtaining it. Hudson v. Bingham, 637.
BILLS AND NOTES. See CounTs, 2. HUSBAND AND W ' E, 28. PARTNER-
SHIP, 6. STAMP, 5. TROVER, 3. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 19.
1. The contract implied by law from a blank endorsement of a negotiable
note before maturity by the payee, is as certain and absolute as if written out
in full, and parol evidence is not admissible to contradict it. Dale v. Gear,
14.
2. This rule is applicable between endorser and endorsee, and it is not
competent for the former to prove a cotemporaneous, naked agreement, that
unrestricted endorsement should be operative as a restricted on only in bar
of ain action by the latter. Id.
3. But any fact or transaction which raises an equity between such parties,
and shows it to be inequitable or a fraud to enforce the contract,-a: that the
endorsee is an agent, or that the note was endorsed for a speciri purpose
creating a trust, or foi the accommodation of the endorsee, or pursuant to an
antecedent agreement that the note should be taken for a debt or for goods,
on the responsibility of the maker alone, may be shown by parol in bar of the
action. Id.
4. Before damages can be recoveied for protest, there must be such demand
and notice as will charge endorsee. Noyes v. White et al., 61.
5. An assignment by a railroad company of a note and mortgage attached
to a negotiable bond as security, need not be by an endorsement of the note.
,llurphq v. Dunning, 125.
6. A denial that the company ever endorsed the note, will not put the plain-
uiff on proof of the officer's authority to make the assignment. Id.
7. Where goods are sold to N. & B., and N.'s note taken for the price, the
zubsequent surrender of N.'s note furnishes no consideration for taking
B.'s, and suit on the latter must fail. Gammon v. Plaisted, 254.
8. The burden of proof is on the defendant, alleging that a negotiable
note has been altered since he signed it. 111eikel v. Sarings Institution, 319.
9. After notice of the assignment of a note to a third party, the maker
cannot purchase claims against the original payee so as to entitle him to a set-
off against the holder. Goldthwait v. Bradford, 319.
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10. Any member of a firm has authority to bind it by endorsing negotiable
paper payable to the firm. Barrett v. Russell 4 Flint, 399.
11. Primdfacie, the face of the note fixes the sum to be recovered without
stating the amount paid for it. Lee v. Pile, 530.
12. No allegation contradicting the written endorsement will avail. Id.
13. The alteration of a negotiable promissory note after its execution, by
filling blanks in a printed form, so as to make the note draw interest at a
given rate from date, avoids the note in the hands of an innocent holder for
value who has received the same in the usual course of trade, and before ma-
turity. Washington Savings Bank v. Ekey, 625.
14. The payee of a note takes it upon the faith of the persons whose'names
appear as maker. Smith v. Hill, 733.
15. Proof of notice and demands, on endorser, is not necessary when he
has promised absolutely to pay the note at maturity. Schley, Executrix, v.
Merritt, 784.
BILL OF LADING. See SHIPPING, 3, 5.
BOND. See HUSBAND & WIrE, 23.
1. A bond deposited in escrow gives no right of action to the obligee, until
the condition on which it is held, is performed. Roberts v. Mullenix, 120.
2. If the bond is fraudulently obtained, and assigned, the assignee obtains
no right against the obligor. Id.
3. A bond executed by two persons, with ablank in the bond where the name
of the obligee is to be inserted, and delivered, in this condition, to one of the
persons by the other, with parol authority, to borrow money upon it and to
insert the name of the person from whom the money is obtained, in the blank,
as the obligee, is a mere nullity and is not the deed of the person so delivering
it. Preston v. Hull, 699.
4. An agent cannot be empowered bytparol to insert the name of the ob-
ligee in such an instrument. .d.
5. The case of Texira v. Evans decided not to be law in Virginia. Id.
6. Official bonds and those given by trustees for faithful administration
should be construed with reference to the period which they are intended to
cover, and not with reference to the date or the time of execution of the in-
strument. Moore v. Potter, 764.
BOUNDARIES.
Monuments and abuttals govern courses and distances in a description in a
deed. Bundy v. Morgan, 401.
BRIDGE. See Rrvwn, 1.
BROKER.
1. A broker who uses stock pledged, to borrow money for his own purposes,
without the owner's consent, is liable to the pledgor in an action for a con-
version. Lawrence v. Maxwell, 470.
2. In such an action evidence that it is customary among brokers to use
stock in that way is inadmissible. Id.
3. Brokers who use the stock of their principals relying on such a custom,
are liable to return it, when called upon, if their demands are satisfied, and
if they cannot, they are liable in damages. .d.
4. Brokers employed to purchase stock and carry it, wrote to their princi-
pal for further security or they would not carry it, the stock remained with
them until it was worthless. They were entitled to recover for the money
advanced. Esser v. Linderman, 728.
5. If they had sold without further notice and the stock had advanced they
would have been responsible. Id.
6. Having proved the purchase of the stock they need not produce the cer-
tificate at the trial. Id.
7. Where one purchases a chattel for another he may sue for the money
without a tender of the thing. .d.
8. Where one broker employs another to sell the stock of his principal,
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the latter cannot set off a debt due him by the original broker in a suit by tne
principal for the proceeds. Evans v. Wain, 728.
9. Evidence that it was the custom of brokers in their dealings with brokers
of other cities, to put all transactions between them into one account and
settle for the balance, is inadmissible. Id.
10. The action for the proceeds was properly brought in the name of the
principal. Id.
CAPITAL. See COxPORATION, 7.
CASES APPROVED, OVERRULED, &c.
Crosby v. Roub, 16 Wis. 616, approved. Murphy v. Dunning, 126.
Bange v. Flint, 25 Wis. 544, approved. Murphy v. Dunning, 126.
Douglas v. Wickwire, 19 Conn. 492, disapproved. 7ke State v. Carrel,
165.
Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 589, commented on. The State v. Carrots,
165.
The China, 7 Wall. 58, affirmed. The Merrimac, 185.
Jones v. Pettibone, 2 Wis. 319, approved. Wisconsin Imp. Co. v. Lyons, 195.
Tracy v. Strong, 2 Conn. 659, approved and followed. Studwell v. Cooke,
223.
Wood v. Railway Co., 27 Wis. 541, overruled. Conkey T. M. 4- St. P.
R. R. Co., 365.
Taylor v. Rountree, 3 Wis., overruled. Wals v. Grosvenor, 471.
Corn Exchange Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 613, approved. Kidd v.
Conway, 663.
Union Baptist Society v. Candia, 2 N. H. 20, affirmed. South Hampton v.
Fowler, 669.
Texira v. Evans, not law in Virginia. Preston v. Hull, 699.
Gilbert v. Henck, 6 Casey 205, overruled. Ashton v. Bayard, 792.
CASTLE. See ASSAULT.
CERTIORARI.
1. The writ of certiorari is allowed and the remedy granted, solely in the
discretion of the court, and it may be dismissed without passing upon the
merits of the questions intended to be raised. The People ex rel. Curtis v.
Common Council of Utica, 657.
2. An adjudication in order to be reviewed by it must be such a one as is
final in its nature. .d.
3. It is too late to apply for the writ after the lapse of two years from the
act sought to be reviewed. Id.
CHARTER. See CORPORATION, 7, 8, 18.
CHECK.
.. A paper writing worded thus :-Philadelphia, November .22d 1869.
The Commonwealth National Bank pay to H. Yerkes or order, one hundred
and fifty (December 3d 1869) dollars. John B. Champion :"-stamped as
a bill of exchange, and negotiated in the markJet before maturity; held to be
a check, and not entitled to days of grace. Champion v. Gordon, 6.
2. The bond fide holder of a certified check is entitled to recover from tie
bank, although the check is a forgery. Hagen y. The .Bowery Nat. Bank, 594.
3. There can be no real payee of a forged check. .d.
4. As between the holder and the bank the liability of the latter attaches
upon the check being certified. Id.
CHURCH.
THE LAW Or RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES AND CHURCH CORPORATIONS IN
OHIO, 201, 329, 537.
CIVIL LAW.
THE RELATION OF THE CIVIL TO THE CoMitoN LAw, 673.
CITIZEN. See ADMIRALTY, 5.
VATURAL ALLEGIANCE, 69.
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CoMMERCIAL LAW.
1s THERE A GENERAL COMMEROIAL LAW ADMINISTERED BY THI COURTS
OF THE UNITED STATES, 473.
COMMON CARRIER.
1. It is a clear duty belonging to common carriers of merchandise nnder
their contract, to deliver his goods to the consignee if he presents himself at
the proper place and in proper time to receive them, and, in such case, there
is no room, nor any occasion for the interposition of a warehouseman, although
the carriers make known and regular transits, and have a warehouse and plat-
forms for the delivery of goods at the end of the transit ; and the carrier is
not discharged from liability as a carrier, by placing such goods either on the
platform or in the warehouse for delivery. And the consignee is entitled to
a fair and reasonable time and opportunity to receive his goods, and until he
has had such time and opportunity, the goods remain in the care of the carrier
as such. Graves v. H. 6- N. Y. Steamboat Co., 23.
q. When a contract is made in one state to transport goods into another;
if the goods are lost the rights of the parties are governed by the laws of the
state where the loss happens. Gray v. Jackson, 53.
3. A contract between two common carriers, having connecting lines and
running privileges over each other's routes, by which a certain kind of busi-
ness is to be performed solely by one of them, will not be enforced in equity
by injunction, or in any manner which will prevent either carrier from per-
forming its duties to the public. P. 4- R. I. Railroad Co. v. Mining Co., 277.
4. A railroad company and a coal company, both being carriers of freight,
with connecting lines, made an agreement that the coal company should carry
all the coal between two certain points, and perform all the public duties in-
Cumbent on the railroad company, in reference to the carriage of coal ; and
that if any coal should be carried by the railroad company, the latter should
pay the coal company fifty cents per ton for such carriage, and the right of
the railroad company to use certain parts of the road and bridges of the coal
company should cease and be suspended while such payments should be in
arrear. Held, that whether such agreement was binding or not on the par-
ties, a court of equity would not enforce it by injunction, so as to interfere
with the public right to demand carriage of coal by either party. Id.
5. A railway company is liable as a common carrier, and is an insurer of
the goods, not only while the goods are in actual transit over its line of rail-
-vay, but until an actual delivery of the goods to the next succeeding carrier.
Conkey v. Ml. 4. St. P. R. R. Co., 365.
6. If the succeeding carrier should refuse to accept delivery of the goods,
or in case of a break or interruption in the line of transit, as by storm, flood
or earthquake, or by fact of war, rendering it impossible to send the goods
forward, or causing considerable delay in the transportation, the carrier
might relieve itself of its strict liability as a common carrier by storing the
goods and notifying the owner or consignor thereof. Id.
7. The case of Wood v. Railway Company, 27 Wis. 541, overruled. Id.
8. An action may be mainiained by a common carrier against a person
knowingly sending by such carrier explosive and dangerous articles, recently
discovered and manufactured, not known to the carrier to be such, and with-
out notice of their character, for any damages caused by the explosion thereof
from their inherent tendency to explode or improper packing. B. 4. A. Rail-
road v. Shanly, 500.
') But not against a person who merely orders the same to be so sent as a
purcnaser, although he gives no such notice. Id.
10. If two persons, without any concert or knowledge of each other's acts,
io send two such articles, one of which causes the explosion of the other,
an action may be maintained against them jointly. Id.
11. A third person, whose property near the railroad is injured by the ex-
plosion, may also maintain such action. Id.
12. If the action is brought in the name of the third person for tie benefit
of de arrier as assignee, this is no ground for demurrer. Id.
13. In New York common carriers can limit the extent of their liability
Vy contract with the shippers. Fibel v. Livingston, 594.
VOL. XXI.-52
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14. A notice at the head of a receipt for freight, is not sufficient to ccnstt-
tute a contract unless it is proved to have been brought to the shiuper's know-
ledge. Fibel v. Livingston, 594.
15. There is an implied duty on the part of a shipper of dangerous articles
to notify the carrier. Barney v. Burnstenbinder, 599.
16. Failure to do so will render him liable for the consequences. Id.
CONFEDERATE STATES.
1. Where one, during the late war, voluntarily left his place of residence
within the Union lines, he cannot avoid proceedings against him as absentee,
on the ground of his inability to return. Frman v. Scott, 60.
2. Where a citizen of Kentucky leaves his home and enters the service of
the Confederate States, the presumption is that his sympathy is with the South-
ern cause, and to rebut this he must show that such absence from home was
enforced. Thomas v. Mahone, 433.
3. The civil code of Kentucky authorizes the creditors of a citizen who
leaves the county of his residence and remains absent thirty days within the
Confederate lines, to attach his property and sell the same for payment of
their debts. Id.
4. The fact that the debtor was a soldier in the Confederate army, would
not deprive the court of jurisdiction under the code. Id.
5. When the premises are used as an encampment by the Federal Govern-
ment, and notice of the attachment is served on the officer in command, the
attachment will be valid. Id.
6. A citizen of Maryland is liable to be proceeded against by an order of
publication granted by the courts of the state, though he is within the Confed-
erate lines. Dorsey v. Thompson, 732.
7. He will be presumed to have notice from the due publication of the
order of court, and the court will have jurisdiction. Id.
S. Purchasers under an order of the court decreeing a sale of such citizens'
real estate, will be protected in their titles. Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See EQUITY, 13.
1. As a general rule the title to personal property perfected in one state,
according to the laws of that state, is respected in all other states and coun-
tries into which the property may come. The validity of transfers of such
property depends in general upon the placq of the contract ; sometimes the
situs of the property is an important consiaeration. The5e general rules are,
however, subject to the exception that every state must judge for itself how
far it will give effect to the laws of other states. Ballard v. linter, 759.
2. The rule of law in Connecticut which requires a change of possession to
accompany sales and mortgages of personal property, in order to perfect
the title as against creditors of the vendor or mortgagor, is not a mere rule
of evidence, but of positive law. But this rule does not, as such, apply to
property located without the jurisdiction of, the state, and ought not to be
applied to a contract made in good faith in another state, between citizens of
iiat state, according to the laws of that state, in relation to property there
situate, with no purpose of being executed in this state, or of evading its
laws. Id.
3. A probate of a will in Louisiana, of a person domiciled in New York
at the time of his death, is valid until set aside in Louisiana. Foulke v. Zim-
merman, 120.
4. A purchaser from a devisee of such will, of real estate in Louisiana,
while the probate remains in force, is an innocent purchaser, and is not affectee
by a subsequent order setting aside the will. Id.
5. Ever where the order is founded on the judgment of a court of New
York declaring the will void. .d.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
I. Power of the Legislature. See COURTS, 13.
1. The Chatham Local Option Law declared the retail 'of ardent spirits
without license to be unlawful, and provides that no license shall be granted
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f a majority vote of the township is for "1 no license." Held that the act is
constitutional. State v. Jforris Common Pleas, 32.
2. The legislature, under the power to make police regulations, may pro-
hibit the retail of alcoholic stimulants. Id.
3. Mlunicipal corporations and townships, or the people thereof, acting
collectively, may he invested with authority to regulate or prohibit the retail
of intoxicating drinks. Id.
4. In matters of pure legislation one legislature cannot bind another.
Gilliland et al. v. Schuyler, 54.
5. The right to contest an election is not a vested right. Given by one leg-
islature it may be taken away by another. Ad.
6. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY Or LOCAL OPTION LAWS, 129.
7. The power of the legislature is omnipotent within constitutional limits.
The People v. New York Gas Light Co., 99.
8. Though an act of the legislature be unconstitutional it may by a subse-
quent act direct the expenses of such legislation to be paid. The People ex
rel. Kingsland v. Bradley, 594.
9. The power of the legislature is omnipotent within constitutional limits.
The People v. New York Gas Co., 594.
10. There is a distinction between private citizens and incorporated towns
and. cities, the latter are subject at all times to the control of the legislature
which has a right as trustee of the public interest to inspect, regulate and
control their funds and franchises. Mayor, 4-c. v. Sehner, 729.
II. Power of the States.
11. The power to regulate, provide for and control the surrender of fugi-
tives from justice from foreign countries is by the Federal Constitution con-
ferred exclusively on the Federal Government, and cannot be exercised by
the states. People v. Curtis, 94.
12. A state law giving the Governor power to surrender a criminal to a
foreign country is contrary to the provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion. Id.
13. The term "due process of law" in the Constitution of Wisconsin, Art.
I, sect. 8, does not mean a presentment or indictment by a grand jury. Rowan
v. State, 189.
14. The 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not
prevent states punishing felonies by criminal informations without indict-
ment. Id.
IlL. Taking Private Property.
15. Private property cannot be taken for public use until its value has been
ascertained in a legal manner, and such value paid or secured to the owner.
Bohlman v. G. B. 6- Lake Pepin Railroad Co., 187.
16. An attempt to enter on land without the damage for its taking having
been ascertained, will be restrained by injunction. 1d.
17. The statute of Wisconsin which provides that, "no injunction shall be
granted to prevent the use of land by a railway company, until final judgment
is entered for damages," applies only to cases where the land has been occu-
pied by the owner's consent. Id.
18. The fact of the road being surveyed and located without protest, gives
the company no right to permanently occupy the land. Id.
CONTRACT. See JUDGMENT, 7. STREETS, 1.
1. Distinction between the motive for, and the actual consideration of a con-
tract. Philpot v. Gunninger, 188.
2. A consideration moving from A. to B., with whom C. afterwards enters
into partnership and thus obtains the benefit of, will support a promise by C.
Id.
3. A contract of sale of goods "deliverable sound and in good order." is
not a warranty that the entire goods shall be so. Townsend et al. v. Shepard,
399.
4. If the vendee waives the objection that they are unsound, the vendor
must deliver. .ld.
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5. If vendor refuse to deliver he must pay such damages as the vendee sus-
tains. Townsend et al. v. Shepard, 399.
6. Where any part of the consideration is illegal, the contract is wholly
vitiated, but it is otherwise where part is only void or voidable. Clements v.
Marston, 530.
7. A promise by a father to give up certain notes executed by his son, is
executory, and natural love and affection is not a sufficieut consideration for
such a promise. Denman v. MeMahin, 530.
8. A subscription for stock in a railroad, is a contract between the sub-
scriber and the corporation. Melvin v. Boitt. 531.
9. Where A. accepted in writing, an order to pay a claim out of the pro-
ceeds of a certain note in his hands, he cannot afterwards change his liability
on the ground that there was a parol agreement that he was to be paid his in-
debtedness first. Ailler, Executor, v. Goldthwait, Administrator, 661.
CONVERSION. See INFANT, 4.
CORPORATION.
1. The plaintiffs, a railroad company, wefe incorporated with a capital of
500,00o, with power " to call the first meeting of tle stockholders whenever
$100.0o, or more of the capital stock shall have been subscribed for, to choose
directors and perfect the organization of said corporation," and 'when so
organize! to proceed to commence the construction of the railroad." IV. H.
" D. Railroad Co. v. Chapman, 80.
2. The sum of $216,700 was subscribed, including the subscriptions of tie
defendants, and the first meeting of the stockholders was then held an] di-
rectors chosen. Subsequently an amendment to the plaintiffs' charter was
passed by the General Assembly, authorizing the city of New Haven to sub-
scribe $200,000 to the capital stock, and to appoint two directors in the com-
pany, with one vote for every four shares of stock held by the city. Pursuant
to the power so given, the city of New Haven subscribed $200,000 to the
stock, and appointed two directors who assumed and continued to discharge
the duties of the office. Id.
3. No other subscriptions were made, and the directors thereupon proceeded
to call in the capital stock, and to commence the construction of the railroad.
I 2d.
4. In an action to recover subscriptions to the stock, IIdd, 1. That the
term 4" organize, ' as used in the charter, embraced merely the choice lv the
stockholders if the necessary officers for tile transaction of the husine-s of
the company. and that the plaintiffs, when so organized, $100,000 haviug
been subscrli,cdl to the stock, might legally begin the exercise of their cor-
porate franchise. 2. That the amendment to the charter, and the action of
the plaintiffs and the city under it, did not impair the rights of the defendants
as stockhollers, or relieve them from liability on theirsubscription. Id.
5. A railroad corporation cannot lawtully take, hold and deal in real
estate for other purposes and to a greater extent than it is authorized so to
do hy its charter, hut the amount of lands which such corporation can legally
hold, can only le determined by a direct procceding against the same by the
state for a violation of its charter. Land v. Hoinan, 143.
6. While a contract to convey to such corporation land which is not to be
used for the purpose for which it is authorized by its charter to hol! real estate
cannot he specifically enforced in a court of equity, yet a dced made to such
corporation, and by the corporation to a third party, operates to convev all
the title of the original grantor. .d.
7. Where the charter of a corporation fixes the amnount of its capital stock
unct ae number of shares into which it shall lie divided, tile corporation
cannot make assessments oii the shares subscribed, tIr the pl -ose of carrying
on the general business of the comlany, until all the capital .stock h.,.s hecn
subscribed, unless either expressly or by implication a difercnt intnt a.ppears
in tile charter, or in the contract of subscription. P. J R. J. Iailway uo.
v. Preston, 242.
8. The charter of a railway company provided that its capital stock should
be one million dollars, and be divided into shares of one ludrcd dollars each ;
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that the persons named as corporators should be authorized to cause books to
be opened for receiving subscriptions to the stock to the amount of $100,000;
that each subscriber at the time of subscription should pay five dollars on
each share by him subscribed ; that the corporate powers should be vested in
a board of nine directors ; that the first election for directors should be held as
soon as might be after said $100,000 of stock should have have been sub.-
scribed ; that the directors should have power, and were required, to re-open
the books to fill up the capital stock, and to continue to receive subscriptions
thereto until the whole amount should have been taken ; and that all sub-
scriptions should be paid at such times, and in such amounts, and on such
conditions as the directors might prescribe. Id.
-9. H ed, that the directors could not call for payments on the subscriptions
until the entire one million dollars of stock had been subscribed. Id.
10. An act amending the charter of the company, by which it was author-
ized to construct and maintain a branch railroad from some suitable point on
its main line to a point named in said amendatory act, did not so change the
purposes of the incorporation as to release previous subscribers to the stock
from payment of their subscriptions. Id.
11. It is no defence to an action by the assignee of a corporation against
a stockholder that the corporate proceedings have not been strictly according
to statute. Upton v. Hansbrough, 462.
12. The stockholders in a corporation de facto cannot object that it is not
one de jure. Id.
13. One who voluntarily takes stock in a corporation which has all the ex-
ternal indicia of being a corporation, cannot deny the authority to issue such
stock, nor his liability thereunder to the creditors. Id.
14. A provision in the charter requiring a corporation to take securities
for its stock, does not prohibit it from selling stock on other terms. Id.
15. A court of bankruptcy has all the powers vested in the officers of a
company in regard to making assessments and calls of stock. !"d.
16. The fact that the officers represented that no assessment would ever be
made, is no defence as against the creditors of the corporation. Id.
17. The purchaser of a certificate of stock who surrendersit and has one
issued to himself, assumes the liabilities of an original subscriber. Id.
18. When a charter directs that all elections of directors shall be at such
times as by-laws direct, no election can be held until a by-law directing
when, has been adopted. Johnson et al. v. Jones et al., 467.
19. Acts required to be done by the directors of a company, must be done
by them when lawfully convened. Id.
20. An election is not legal if the list of stockholders exhibited on the day
of election is not a true list. Id.
21. Stockholders who are not such on the day of election cannot vote. rd.
22. A majority of the board of directors can use the name of the corpora-
tion in a suit. .d.
23. Every member of an unincorporated joint-stock company is personally
liable for all its debts. Frost v. Walker, 670.
24. It is sufficient to authorize a finding that persons are members, if their
names are proved to be upon the subscription books, for the capital stock. Id.
25. By contributing to the capital, the subscribers became entitled to a share
in the profits, and liable as copartners. Id.
26. There is no distinction between a subscriber for stock and a stock-
holder, as regards their liability. Id.
27. Directors in a stock company are not as to the stockholders, technical
trustees. Spering's Appeal, 784.
28. They are not liable for mistakes of judgment, especially where acting
under legal advice. Id.
29. They are responsible to the stockholders for losses from fraud, embez.
zlement, wilful misconduct, breach of trust, gross inattention or negligence,
by which fraud has been perpetrated by the agents, officers or co-directors. Id.
30. A subscription to stock of $10,000, upon condition that good and re-
sponsible persons subscribe $50,000 within one year to the corporation, means
that the $10,000 is to be included in the $50,000. Mont. J- IW, . B. Co. v.
Langdon, 784.
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1. So long as good faith is observed, the defendant is not bound to active
diligence in collecting his costs of the original plaintiff. Heywood v. Benton,
55.
2. Costs are not incident to the debt, or to the action until it is pending,
and although expense may have been made preparatory to its commencement,
the plaintiff has no right to demand costs for that reason, nor is the defend-
ant obliged to tender them until they become thus incident by the commence.
ment of the action, which in this state is the actual service of process on the
defendant. Studwell v. Cooke, 223.
3. There is no equity in favor of a creditor to require a debtor to pay the
expenses of proceedings taken for the institution of a suit, before its actual
commencement, so strong as to prevail over the right of the. debtor to make
tender of the debt. Id.
4. No right to costs by reason of an equity has ever been recognised by the
common law, and a court of law cannot yield to such an equity without a
departure from principle. Id.
5. From a review of the authorities in England and in this country, it
appears that every attempt which has been' made to induce courts of law to
recognise such an equity, and to require payment of costs before suit pending,
has failed. Id.
6. Therefore, where in foreign attachment, after service on the garnishee,
but before service on the defendant, the defendant tendered to the plaintiff the
amount of the debt alone, without the costs of the suit, it was held that such
tender was sufficient. Id.
7. Where a defect of parties is apparent on the complaint but no objection
made until after appeal, neither party is entitled to the costs of the appeal.
Fisher v. Hubbell, 733.
COUNTY. See HIGHWAY, 8.
A county is not liable for medical services rendered to prisoners in the
county jail. Roberts v. County Commissioners, 121.
C i uPON. See LIMITATIONS, 1.
COURTS See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 4. JUDGMENT, 3. NOTICE. PRACTICE,
17, 20.
1. The restriction of the I1th section of the Judiciary Act, giving original
jurisdiction to the Circuit Courts, does not apply to cases where either party
believes that from local influence lie will not be able to obtain justice in a
state court. Ciij of Lexington v. Butler, 127.
2. Suits on negotiable paper are not within the exception to the 1 lth section
of the Judiciary Act. Id.
3. To take a case to the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground
that the state court refused to give full faith and credit to tie judicial reoord
of another state, it is necessary that the record should show that it was an-
thenticated in the mode prescribed by the Act of May 26th 1790. Caperton
v. B dlard, 198.
4. The United States courts have not jurisdiction to restrain a sheriff from
iclling under an execution from a state court. Rug gles v. Sionton, 4C1.
5. The state court having first obtained jurisdiction, it is exclusive. Id.
6. This rule does not apply however to bankrupts d.
7. The Circuit Court of the United States has jurisdiction of a common-
law or equity action brought by an assignee in bankruptcy appointed in
another district where such assignee is a citizen of another state, and the de-
f-ndant is a citizen of the state where the action is brought and the amount
in dispute exceeds the sum of $500. Paysqn v. Dietz, 511.
8. Jurisdiction of tle state aid federal courts as affected b3 the Bankruptcy
Act considered. el.
9. The Act of April 20th 1871 does not authorize the removal of a case
from the state courts in every case in which the United States courts would
have original jurisdiction. Gauughan v. Fertilizing Co., 569.
10. Congress did not intend by the general words used to extend jurisdic-
uon to remove, except under the circumstances specified in the act. Id.
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11. The Circuit Courts of the United States have jurisdiction of a bill to
enjoin the executors of a will, which has been admitted to probate by the
county court of a state, from using it to defeat the rights of a citizen of another
state. Amory v. Amory et al., 585.
12. The decree or judgment of a state court can be avoided on the ground
of fraud, both in the courts of the United States and of another state. Id.
13. The legislature of a state cannot deprive a citizen of another state -of
his legal or equitable rights under the Constitution and the laws of Congress,
hv declaring in what courts they must be enforced. Id.
14. If a court has no jurisdiction there is no trial. Loeb v. Mathis, 665.
15. An objection to the jurisdiction is not waived by failing to demur or
answer. id.
COVENANT. See GROUND-RENT, 1, 2.
1. Covenants for title run with the land, enure for the protection of the
owner for the time being, and may be enforced by the heirs, devisees and
alienees of the covenantee. Crisfield v. Storr, 55.
2. In actions on covenant of warranty it is necessary to prove eviction by
title paramount, and a narr. which fails to allege this will be bad on demurrer.
Id.
3. Where an action is brought against the heirs of the covenantor, they are
jointly liable, and the verdict should be against them in solido. Id.
4. Limitations do not begin to run until there is a breach of the covenant
of warranty. .d.
5. A covenantee who has suffered eviction is not bound to seek satisfaction
of his claim out of the personal estate of his covenantor, before resorting tu.
his heirs. Id.
6. An outstanding tax certificate at the date of conveyance, is a breach of
covenant against encumbrances. Eaton v. Lyman, 189.
7. A covenantee is entitled to recover the amount necessary to remove an
encumbrance, not exceeding the purchase-money of the land. .d.
8. Proof that the grantee has been evicted does not necessarily show
breach of the covenant of warranty. Id.
9. An agreement intended to be signed and sealed by two, but only signed
and sealed by one, binds the one only. W. Md. R. R. Co. v. Orendorff,
785.
CRIMINAL LAW.
I. General.
1. A marriage between a white and a negro is a criminal offence by the
laws of Indiana. The State v. Gibson, 319.
2. When the facts proved on the part of the prosecution show that the re-
spondent claimed to do the act resulting in death to the assailant in self-
defence, the burden of proof rests from the first upon the prosecutor to show
beyond reasonable doubt that the act was criminal. State v. Patterson, 647.
3. Where a statute defining an offence contains an exception in the enact-
ing clause, which is so incorporated with the language defining the offence,
that the ingredients of the offence cannot be fully set out without negativing
the exception, an indictment must allege enough to show that the accused
is not within the exception. United States v. Cooke, 682.
4. But if the exception is separable from the language of the enacting
clause, and the offence can be fully and accurately defined without reference
to it, the indictment is good without such reference. Id.
5. An indictment charged the accused with the commission, more than
two years previously, of certain acts amounting to an offence as defined by
an Act of Congress; another act limited prosecutions for this and other
offences to two years, unless the accused had been a fugitive from justice.
On demurrer the indictment was held good, though it did not allege that the
accused was within the exception. Id.
II. Murder.
6. An indictment for murder charging that the accused did wilfully, feloni-
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ously and of his malice aforethought, kill and murder, is valid. Rowan v.
State, 189.
7. Information communicated by others tO the person who kills another
because of it can never be permitted to reduce the killing from murder to
manslaughter. Fralich v. The People, 659.
IlL. Bribery.
8. A proposal by an officer to receive a bribe, though not bribery, is an
indictable misdemeanor at common law. Walsh v. The People, 617.
IV. Perjury.
9. In trial for perjury the materiality of the false testimony is a question
of law for the court. State of Kansas v. Lewis, 126.
10. If left to the jury, and their verdict determines the question as the court
should have instructed them, no error is (lone. Id.
11. Where information charges offence as done at certain time and place,
evidence that defendant was at the time, at a remote place is material. Id.
12. Failure to enter a plea, will not make trial so far void that false
swearing cannot be perjury. Id.
V. Assault.
13. An assault on a man's house can only be regarded as an assault on his
person when the purpose of the assault is an injury to the person of the occu-
pant or one of his family. State v. Patterson, 400.
CURTESY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, II.
CUSTOM. See BROKER, 9 ; SHIPPING, 11 ; USAGE, 1.
DAM. See EASEMENT, 7 ; RIVER, 1.
Where a party has sustained damage from the unlawful erection of a dam
over a navigable stream lie may maintain an action for relief, and against its
further maintenance. Wlisconsin Imp. Co. v. Lyons, 196.
I)AMAGES. See AsSUIfPSIT, 6; BANKRUPTCY, 22; EQUITY, 20 ; LEGAL
TENDER ; MNALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 5 ; RAILROAD, 2. 4, 8; STREAm, 2.
1. In an action of covenant by the assignee of covenantee, the measure of
damages is the consideration which the assignee paid to his grantor, with in-
terest from the eviction, and costs in an ejectment suit. Cris;fie!d v. Starr, 55.
2. Counsel fees paid in defending ejectment suit cannot le recovered as
part of tie damages, unless the covenantor refuses to defend the title. 1d.
3. Under the General Statutes of New 1tamp-hire the owner of a dog 1.4
liable for double damages to the person injured whether lie knew of the vicious
habits of the animal or not. 0-ne v. Roberts, 55.
4. In an action by mortgagee for illegal seizure of goods under a void at
tachment, the defendant may prove in mitigation of damages, that at tie
tine of seizure there was rent in arrear for the premises where the goolts
-ere, which was paid by the sheriff out of the proceeds. 1'aaanaker v.
,owes, 61.
5. In the absence of evidence of wanton or malicious wrong in seizing the
goods, exemplary damages should not be allowed. Id.
6. The measure of damages must be determined by the facts of each ease.
Id.
7. In trespass qu. cl., the declaration alleged that the defendant broke and
entered into the plaintiff's land, and trod down and destroyed the herbage,
and cut down the trees, and dug up the ground, to the plaintiffs damage.
The plaintiff introduced evidence to prove that the defendant not onily cut
dox n the trees, but removed the wood ; and the court charged the jury, that
in estimating damages they might take into con-ideration the cutting and
removal of the wood, if the trespass was or- continued act. Held, that the
evidence was inadmissible, and the charge erroneous. Johnsou v. Gorhab.,
271.
8. Where a railroad, without the owner's consent, enters upon his land and
occupies it, the company is liable for the value of the land at the time of oc-
cupation. Graham v. C. " N. 0. R. R. Co., 327.
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9. For refusal to receive deed and pay for the land, is the difference between
price agreed to be paid, and the real value of the land when the contract was
broken. Griswold v. Sabin, 328.
10. The imposition of a fine in a criminal proceeding for assault and bat-
tery, is no bar to exemplary damages in a civil suit for same act. HoadleS.
v. Watson, 400.
11. The expenses of plaintiff for counsel fees and other trouble in the suit,
are not an element of exemplary damages. Id.
12. A person is answerable for the consequences of his fault only so far
as they are natural and proximate, and therefor may be foreseen. Fairbanks
v. Kerr, 401.
13. Where an agreement in writing for the sale of land, stipulated that on
'a failure by either party to perform he should pay the other $5000, which was
declared to be liquidated damages, it will be held so to be. Leggett v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of New York, 401.
14. It is not error for a court to charge, that the jury would be justified in
giving plaintiff compensation not only for such damages as he had already
sustained but also for such as he will reasonably sustain in the future. Pas-
senger Railway Co. v. Donahue, 405.
15. Damages for negligence are to be measured by the same rule as to
artificial as to natural persons. Id.
16. The damages for the taking of land for railroad purposes should be
estimated as of the day when the company acquired the right to the property.
Driver v. Western Union R. R. Co., 463.
17. The measure of damages is the value of the land taken and the dimi-
nution in value of the adjacent property. Id.
18. In an action for the conversion of stock pledged the measure of damages
is the highest price of the stock between the conversion and day of trial.
Lawrence v. Maxwell, 463.
19. The measure of damages on the breach of a covenant of seisin where
grantee receives no title, is the consideration-money with interest. Lacey v.
Afarnan, 536.
20. In order to entitle a party who claims a sum of money in gross, stipu-
lated to be paid for breach of an agreement, to recover it as liquidated dam-
ages, he must show that it was so considered and intended by the contracting
parties. Davis v. Gillett, 659.
21. Whenever the stipulation for payment for breach of a contract, is a
measure to determine a damage which would otherwise be uncertain and
difficult to ascertain, it is a liquidation of damages and not a penalty. Wolf
Greek Coal Co. v. Schultz, 785.
22. For breach of contract to lease a dye-shop and furnish plaintiff work,
the latter to put in fixtures, the plaintiff is entitled as damages to be put in
the same position as if contract had not been made. Garsed v. Turner, 785.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See FRAUD, 4. TRUST AND TRuSTEE, 11 14.
1. Generally.
1. Where a trust mortgage was made to C. to secure amongst others a debt
of H., who owed a firm of which C. was a member, and H. gave an order
on C. in favor of B., it is an equitable assignment to B., and he can recover
from C. Caldwell v. Hartupee, 401.
2. The mistake of one party and the fraud of the other is as good cause for
vacating the settlement of a claim as a mutual mistake. Bloodgood's Adm'r
v. Seers, 401.
3. Any person may pledge his personal property as collateral security,
though such property would otherwise be exempt by law from sale on execu-
tion. .Jones v. Scott, 531.
4. A creditor who has collateral security may sue his debtor and obtain
judgment without affecting his lien on the property pledged. Id.
5. If nothing is said, the creditor has the right to apply a payment to such
indebtedness as he sees fit. Woods v. Sherman, 791.
II. Sale or Conveyance Frauddent as to Creditors.
6. Where a :omposition is made by creditors with a debtor, any security or
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advantage given to a particular creditor, not provided for in the terms of the
composition and not disclosed, is void, both as to the other creditors and as to
the debtor. Bean v. Amsink, 379.
7. Creditors agreed to accept 70 per cent. in notes, payable at six, twelve
an - eighteen months. One of the creditors, in pursuance of a previous agree-
ment, gave back the notes for the 70 per cent., and took notes for 50 per
cent. payable in 60 days. These notes were paid, but the debtor being unable
to meet the six-month notes, was adjudicated a bankrupt. Held, that his as-
signee could recover back the money paid to the creditor on the sixty-day
notes. Id.
8. Where the plaintiff owned a U. S. 5-20 bond in the possession of the
defendants at the time of their making a fraudulent transfer of their prop-
erty, which they afterwards converted to their use, he will be held to be a
creditor entitled to protection. Pendleton v. Hughe., 660.
9. Where the direct effect of a conveyance and of omitting to put it on
record is to defraud a creditor of the grantor, it will be held fraudulent and
void. Id.
10. And this whether the creditor was one before or after the fraudulent
conveyance. Id.
1i. A conveyance voluntary and without i consideration, executed by H.
and his wife when lie was in embarrassed circumstances, with the understand-
ing that it should be conveyed back to the wife, is fraudulent and void. Pen-
dleton v. Hughes, 662.
DECEDENT'S ESTATE. See ASSUMPSIT, 4, 5.
1. Children have no vested rights as heirs in their father's estate, while he
lives. Morgan v. Perry, 326.
2. Statutes altering the descent of intestates' estates, which only apply to
estates to be settled after its passage, are not retrospective. d.
3. An advancement in money has no effect on the share of real estate de-
scending to a son. Havens v. iompson J- Allen, 460.
4. Whether an agreement by parol or in writing without seal, by the son,
can have any effect is doubtful. Id.
5. A creditor of a decedent's estate must enforce his claim through an exe-
cutor or administrator. |lrilson v. Davis, 531.
6. Any one taking posesssion of decedent's propertywithout administration,
may be sued bv a creditor as an executor de won tort. Id.
7. To bind a decedent's estate, his legal representative must be made a party
in his representative character. Fisher v. Hubbell et al., 733.
DEE).
1. Where the members of a firm, authorize one partner to sign and seal
an instrument prior to its execution, it will be regarded as the the deed of the
firm. Gibson v. l|1arden, 119.
2. The recording acts of Wisconsin apply in favor of titles made through
judicial sales and conveyances. Ehle v. Brown et al., 121.
3. Where a mortgage is foreclosed against all persons having any title of
record, a prior unrecorded deed is void against the sheriff's vendee in the fore-
closure suit. 1d.
4. The recording acts of Wisconsin, apply not only in favor of sulequent
purchasers immediately .from the same grantor, but also to those who take
through mesne conveyances. Fallass, Administrator, v. Pierce et al., 121.
5. A (iced executed under a power of attorney duly iecorded but having
no certificate authenticating the signature of the justice to the acknowledg-
ment, if duly recorded, is a valid record. Ii1.
6. An instrument in writing under hand asd seal, but without the acknow-
ledgment or subscribing witnesses rendered requite by the Revised Statutes
)f New York, is insufficient to convey real estate, and is void against a pur-
chaser. Roggen v. Avery, 122.
7. Under the laws of Kansas of 1859, priority over an unrecorded deed
can only be claimed by a purchaser for a valuable consideration. Coon v.
Browning, 531.
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8. A deed executed before the assignment of the patent passes the title.
Coon v. Browning, 631.
9. Under the laws of 1862 of Kansas, the deputy county clerk could exe-
cute a valid tax deed. Whitford v. Lynch, 595.
10. Where a deed is made and delivered upon a condition, if it is never
performed the deed is inoperative. Pendleton v. Hughes, 660.
11. An escrow signed, sealed and deposited, is not recoverable by the de-
positor except according to the terms of the agreement and deposit. Stanton
v. Miller, 729.
12. The depositary is as much an agent of the grantee as of the grantor.
Id.
13. Although a deed may not take effect without actual delivery, when de-
livered the delivery relates back to the time of deposit. Id.
DIRECTORS. See CORPORATION, 19, 26.
DOG. See DAMAGES, 3.
DOMICIL.
1. Domicil is controlled by intention, and intention is evidenced by circum-
stances as well as declarations. Dupuy v. Seymour, 595.
2. There is no arbitrary rule by which domicil may be proved. Id.
3. The domicil of birth or origin continues until it is proved to have been
abandoned or another obtained. Id.
EASEMENT. See RELEASE.
. 1. Constant use of a right of way. which way is found on both sides, is
notice to a purchaser of land, of the easement. McCaun v. Day, 190.
2. Equity will enjoin a purchaser from obstructing a right of way, where
there is no adequate remedy at law. Id.
3. Twenty years' enjoyment of an easement gives no title to its use.
Sterens v. Dennett, 321.
4. In an action for the interruption of the enjoyment of an easement as
appurtenant to an estate, evidence of its use by the public for sixty years is
incompetent. Id.
5. No one can have an easement in his own land. Duston v. Leddell, 321.
6. If the owner of a tract of which one part has the benefit of a drain, in
the nature of an easement, through the other part, sells or devises either, an
easement is created by implication. Id.
7. Where a testator specifies the height to which the lands of one devisee
may be subjected to the flowage of another's dam, it cannot be maintained
above that, though it was higher at the time of testator's death. Id.
,IECTMENT. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1 ; TENANT IN CoMsON, 1.
A conditional verdict in ejeetment may be modified after it is rendered, as
far as the amount to be paid is considered. Napier v. Darlinyton, 407.
ELECTION. See CORPORATION, 20; EQUITY, 27 ; MANDAMUS, 3.
1. On the trial of a contested election, a witness cannot state what persons
not parties to the record told him subsequent to the election. Gilliland et al.
v. Schuyler, 54.
2. Mere irregularities of the election officers will not vitiate an election.
Id.
3. An election is valid though but two judges are appointed. Id.
4. Sections 10, 18, and 64 of the Election Law of Kansas, are directory,
and a disregard of them will not vitiate an election. Id.
5. Election officers who wilfully neglect, or corruptly discharge their duties,
are liable to prosecution and punishment for misdemeanor. Id.
EQUITY. See BANKRUPTCY, 2 ; ExECUTION, 6.
1. The appearance of a defendant to a bill, confers jurisdiction, unless it
is for the purpose of setting up want of jurisdiction. Merrill v. Haughton,
56.
2. If therefore a party appears, and at the same time that he makes the
objection, demurs to the bill for want of equity, the defect of jurisdiction is
cured. Id.
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3. A bill brought to redeem stocks pledged, may be sustained though the
stocks are sold. Herrill v. lIauqlton, 56.
4. A bill by a husband and wife, praying performance of one or other of
two agreements for the conveyance of certain real estate, is not multifarious.
Green and IFife v. Richards. 56.
5. Such a bill might be demrrable for a mi-joinder. Id.
6. Rulc laid down as to necessary parties in chancery. Traders' Bank Y.
Ciaqbell, 119.
7. A bill in equity to compel the stockholders in a corporation to pay their
unpaid sulscriptions. must allege that the defendants by their participaticn in
the orgaiization have waived their right to rely on a partial subscription.
Fiery v Ennert. 254.
8. The doctrine of multifariousness does not apply where there is a com-
mon though not co-extensive liability in the defendans. Id.
9. The corporation must be party to a suit to compel subscription to stock.
Id.
10. Uncertainty in material allegations is not necessarily fatal to a bill filed
to discover uncertain facts entirely in the knowledge of defendant. Vatson
v. .llarran. 320.
11. A lill by a partner of a lottery-firm against his copartners will not
be entertained in New Jersey. Id.
12. Even when the partnership was entered into in a state where such con-
tracts are legal. Id
3. A contract though valid in the state where it is made will not be en-
forced in New Jersey if in violation of public law. Id.
14. A court of equity will decide a question which was proper for an issue,
if it is brought to a hearing. Dunton v. Leddell, 322.
15. Where the fact of a nuisance is clear, equity will interfere without a
trial at law. Id.
16. Will not relieve against a judgment suffered to go against one bynegli-
gence, who had a valid defence. Robinon v. Wheeler, 322.
17. If discovery is needed, he must seek it while the suit at law is pending.
.d.
18. But if it is contrary to equity and good conqcience to enforce a judg-
ment obtained at law, and the party dielo~es a fact. lie could not avail him-
self of as a defence, or if lie was prevented by accident or the fraud of the
other pa' rty, equity will relieve. I.
19. inut if lie coull not hbe a wirues because the suit was against an ad-
mini-trator, the hill will be bad on deniurrer. Id.
20. When a court of equity laz juri-diction, if the relief prayed for cannot
be granted, damages may be awarded in lieu thereof. Muasson 6- Besanson'p
Appeal. 402.
21. E quity will re'train a trespass of a permanent nature. Id.
22. A party-wail belongs to the party who builds it, and equity will restrain
an,,tler'lreaking into it, until he pays for it. Id.
23. No relief %ill le given in equity to nid a deed alleged to convey a good
leval title. anl prior in date to the one against which protedtion is asked.
Blrk v. Kiby. 464.
24. No relief can be given in favor of a conveyance not proved to exist
nor admitted in the an,:wer. Id.
25. A defendant cannot have any positive relief on his part. Id.
26. A court of equity has no jurisdiction to remove an officer from an office
of which lie is in possession, or to declare it forfeited. Johnson et al. v. Jones
et al., 467.
27. Where an election has been obtained by fraud or breach of trust equity
has jurisdiction. ]d
28. Equity cannot correct a midescriptiou of land, sold at a sheriff's sale,
at the suit !.f the purchaser. Rogers v. Abbott et al., 532.
29. The specific performance of an agreement for a conveyance in con-
sideration of support and maintenance may be compelled in equity. Stanton
v Miller, 729.
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30. To compel the delivery of deeds to those entitled to them, is an old
head of equity jurisdiction. Stanton v. Miller, 729.
31. So is the delivery of deeds that have been placed in escrow upon a con-
dition which has been performed. Id.
32. Where the condition has happened the equitable interest of the grantee
is ripened into an absolute equitable (if not) legal title, and the .grantee is
entitled to a delivery of the deed in escrow. Id.
33 A demurrer to plaintiff's replication admits all the facts as therein stated,
and the defendant is bound by them. Farmers' Bank of Maryland v. Thomas,
786.
34. A person becoines a party to equity proceedings and is bound thereby,
by appearing to the suit and filing his claim. Id.
35. A party who seeks payment of his claim out of the proceeds of land
sold under a decree, cannot impeach the decree afterwards. Id.
ERROR AND APPEAL. See DAMAGES, 14. PLEADING, 7. RAILROAD, 18.
1. Testimony erroneously received which may have influenced the finding
of the verdict, cannot be considered an immaterial error. Gilliland et al. v.
schuyler, 54.
2. No appeal lies to the Supreme Court of the United States, from the
decision of a state court, made according to its settled rules of general juris-
prudence, although such rules have been made an article of the Constitution.
Bank of West Tennessee v. Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, 120.
3. After judgment, obtained on a note for the price of a slave, there was a
clause inserted in the Constitution of Louisiana, ", that no amount should be
recovered on a judgment rendered on such an obligation." No appeal lies to
the Supreme Court of the United States, for a refusal of the state court to
enjoin the collection of the judgment. ,Sevier v. Haskell, 120.
4. The Supreme Court will not entertain jurisdiction of cases brought from
state courts, if it appears that besides the Federal question decided, there is
another ground on which the judgment may be sustained. Kennebec Railroad
v. Portland Railroad, 120.
5. A court of error will affirm a judgment which was erroneous when given,
if owing to a change of statutory law it would now be right. Pugh v. McCor-
nick, 190.
6. An instruction that the defendant must make out a broader defence that
is averred in the plea is erroneous. Stowell v. Beagle, 263.
7. It is error to instruct the jury, that if from the want of evidence, they
could not determine the affirmative or negative, they must so answer. The
jury must determine or disagree. Maxwell v. Boyne, 325.
8. The admission of illegal testimony, by a referee, will not warrant a
reversal of his decision, if there is sufficient to sustain his decision without it.
Fabbri et al. v. 3fercantile Mutual Ins. Co., 403.
9. On an appeal from a judgment awarding a peremptory mandamus, if
it appears that the relator is now entitled to the writ, the judgment will be
affirmed. State ex rel. Voight v. Hoeflinger, 469.
10. An erroneous instruction which could not have prejudiced the defend-
ant is no ground for reversal. Luke v. Johnnycake, 532.
11. The court will not reverse because the verdict seems against the weight
of the evidence. Id.
12. A criminal case must be removed from the District Court to the Su-
preme Court of Kansas on appeal and not on petition of error. Boyle v. State
of Kansas, 595.
13. A question not raised by the record will not be considered by the Su-
preme Court. Id.
14. Where the execution of a written instrument is admitted by the plead-
ings, a court of error will not reverse because evidence in proof of such in-
strument was wrongly excluded. Reed v. Arnold, 595.
15. It is error for the court to have any communication with the jury after
a case has been submitted to them, and while they have it under consideration,
except in opeo court. State v. Patterson, 647.
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16. It is also error for the court to furnish the jury a copy of the statutes
of the state while they are out of court deliberating upon their verdict, that
they may read certain provisions, designated by the court, touching the case
under consideration. State v. Patterson, 647.
17. A charge in an action for negligence, that negligence on the part of
the plaintiff must be affirmatively disproved, is erroneous. Robinson v. N.
Y. C. Railroad, 664.
18. Where the record shows that only a portion of the evidence is pre-
served, a court of error is unable to say that an instruction was inapplicable
or erroneous. Gallobeo v. AMitchell, 730.
19. The refusal to withdraw a juror is in the sole discretion of the court
and not reviewable on error. Thompson v. Stevens, 730.
ESCAPE. See SHERIFF, 1.
ESTATES.
Words of inheritance or limitation are not essential to create an estate In
fee. Hawkins v. Chapman, 57.
ESTOPPEL. See PLEADING, 10. VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 17.
1. Where judgment-creditors see a purclhaser of land at its full value, pro-
ceed to crect buildings on the land sold by their debtor, and silently acquiesce,
they will be restrained from issuing execution against the buildings. Dallette
Y. Kemble, 56.
2. Where a grantor by conveyance with warranty, acquires a subsequent
title, it will enure to the grantee by estoppel. Teift v. Munson, 57.
3. A grant by conveyance only, passes simply the interest which the grantor
had. Id.
4. A party is not estopped by his acts from showing the truth, unless he
intended to influence the conduct of another by such acts. Kuhl v. .4ayor of
Jersey City, 190.
5. A receipt for taxes given on receiving a check, does not estop the collec-
tor from showing that the check was unpaid. Id.
6. A party who assists in the sale of property, will be estopped from setting
up a secret equitable title in himself against the purchaser. IWinchell v.
Edwards, 255.
7. Where the complaint of the plaintiff alleges that the defendant claims
to have sold the note to a third party, whom the plaintiff makes defendant;
and such party files an answer, the plaintiff on demurrer is eslopped from
denying that-he is a proper party defendant. Goldthwait v. Bradford, 319.
8. A party may be estopped as well by an act of gross negligence, as of
bad faith, in permitting a purchaser to buy in ignorance of his claim. Stevens
v. Dennett, 323.
9. Admissions which would operate as an estoppel, are not inoperative be-
cause made on Sunday. Rele y v. Butler, 327.
10. One who relies on an estoppel must act in good faith. Bernestine v.
Snuith, 532.
11. Parties who stand by and see a street paved which is a benefit to their
property, will be estopped from questioning the right of the city to do it. The
People ex rel. Curtis v. Common Council of!Utica, 658.
EVICTION. See WARRANTY, 4.
EVIDENCE. See AGENT, I; BROKER, 6; EASEMENT, 4; HlUSBAND AND
WVIFE, 11; INSURANCE, It; MALICIOU6 PROSECUTION, 4; MASTER AND
SERVANT, 4 ; MORTGAGE, 20; PARTNERSHIP, 5; RAILROAD, 3; RhCORD,
3; SIrirIo, 4 ; STAMP, 2 ; TRESPASS, 2 ; WITNESS, 3, 4.
I. Generally.
1. In an action of warranty against the heirs of the covenantor, the record
of the ejectment suit is admissible as evidence to prove the eviction. Cris-
field v. Starr, 55.
2. In an action for assault, evidence of provocation caused by plaintiff's
conduct as long as two or three days before the assault, is admissible. Dfdan
v. Fagan, 118.
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3. The question is, not how long a time has elapsed, but has the party's
blood had time to cool, under the circumstances. Dolan v. Fagan, 118.
4. The destruction or suppression of evidence raises a presumption that the
truth was against the interest of the party so destroying the evidence. 'Win-
cheli Y. Edwards, 255.
5. Where the existence of a contract is to be determined by the mutual
understanding of the parties, evidence of the understanding of each and
every party is admissible. Prescott v. .Locke, 262.
6. The proof of delivery of baggage-checks to the baggage-master of a
railroad company, is evidence tending to show that the company received the
baggage. K. P. R. W. Co. v. Mlontell, 532.
7. The deposition of a register of the land office is competent to prove that
the title to land is in the United States. Lacey v. Marnan, 536.
8. Evidence explaining under what circumstances a draft was delivered is
admissible if it does not contradict the tenor of the draft. Chicago C. J L.
Railroad Co. v. West, 596.
9. Where it was proved, that a letter in the possession of a third person
who was out of the country at the time of trial, had been shown to and read
by a party to the suit, parol proof of its contents is admissible. Tucker et al.
v. Woolsey et al., 596.
10. Mere opinions are not evidence. McNeil v. Davidson, 596.
11. Evidence that defendant contracted with another person to do the same
work for which plaintiff sues is no defence. Bell v. Woodman, 660.
12. A written contract cannot be varied by parol testimony of a different
oral agreement previously made. Id.
13. A fact collateral to the issue, drawn from a witness on cross examina-
tion, cannot be contradicted by the party eliciting it. Id.
14. In an action by husband and wife for personal injuries to the wife, the
defendant proved that the husband in presence of the wife, said that the in-
firmity was caused by overwork, Held, that it was competent for the plaintiff
to show by the same witness that the wife denied it. Lindsey and Wife v.
Danville, 730.
15. In a question of partnership, evidence that the alleged partnership had
been formed fraudulently for the purpose of covering property from creditors
is not admissible. Thomas v. Moore, 734.
16. A plaintiff is entitled to have the whole conversation referred to by one
of his witnesses. Wolf Creek Coal Co. v. Schultz, 786.
17. A general objection to evidence will not avail unless it was irrelevant
or inadmissible for any purpose. Garsed v. Turner, 786.
18. The competency of a witness- cannot be questioned under a general ob-
jection to evidence. Id.
19. When the eidence taken in an equity case is used by the parties in
another action, as original testimony, the jury may form conclusions from it,
without reference to the final decree in the first case. Cooper v. tterbach,
789.
II. Admissions, Declarations, 4-c. See PARTNE SHIP, 18.
20. Declarations of a deceased member of a family as to pedigree are
always admissible. Jones v. Jones, 192.
21. To make dying declarations admissible it is not necessary that declar-
ant should state the whole res gesta of his statement. State v. Patterson,
402.
22. On a question of the genuineness of a signature, the comparison of
handwritings is wholly inadmissible. Hazleton v. Union Bank, 464.
23. The admissions of an agent are admissible against his principal only
where they accompanied the transaction so as to be a part of the res gestce.
Id.
24. Statements of the president of a bank made after payment of a certifi-
cate of deposit, the endorsement of which is in question, are not admissible
against the bank. Hazletqp v. Union Bank, 464.
25. The admissions of a party are always evidence against him. Denman
v. McMahin, 532.
816 ,NDEX.
EVIDENCE.
26. A tax receipt is no evidence of who paid the money. Denman v. Me
Mahin, 532.
27. Communications between an attorney who drew a deed and the gran
tees therein as to what took place are privileged. Rogers v. Lyon et al., 593
28. Declarations of one in possession of property that it is owned by
another, are competent evidence in favor of the owner. Putnam V. Osgood
595.
29. The declarations of one partner are not admissible to prove that anothe-
is a member of the firm. Johnson v. Gallivan, 596.
30. In a suit by an attorney for his services, he can testify as to admission,
made by the defendants of the amount realized by them by his services
McN'eil v. Davidson, 596.
31. Others besides lawyers can testify as to the value of an attorney's ser-
n ces. Ia.
32. It is not necessary in order to make dying declarations admissible in
evidence, that the declarant should state everything constituting the res gestus
of the subject of his statement, but only tlat his statement of any given fact
should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
meaning as to such fact. State v. Patterson, 647.
33. What a prisoner says at any time after the commission of the offence
is competent against him as admissions. Fralich v. The People, 659.
III. Copies, Hearsay.
34. HEARSAY" EVIDENCE, 1.
35. Hearsay testimony to prove that the servants of a railroad were negli-
gent is incompetent. R. P. R. W. Co. v. Painter, 64.
36. A copy of a chattel mortgage, which is not filed in the proper town, is
not competent evidence to show title in mortgagee. Evans v. Sprague, 125.
37. An objection to such evidence must be specific. Id.
38. The rule as to admissibility of parol evidence to vary a written agree-
ment, only refers to the kind of evidence necessary to prove the agreement.
and if it is admitted on the trial or by the pleadings, or proved by parol evi-
dence, the rule is waived and the agreement is as operative as if proved by
writing. Davis v. Goodrich, 402.
39. Where a copy of a written instrument may be used the original may.
Reed v. Arnold, 596.
40. Where an action is upon a written instrument the execution of which
is admitted by the pleadings, there is no issue upon which proof of the in-
strument may be introduced. Id.
41. The record in the office of the register of deeds of a patent is admissi-
ble without proof that the original-is lost. Bernestine v. Smith, 730.
IV. Experts.
42. The opinion of a witness not an expert, as to the value of a stock of
goods in a store, is inadmissible. Taylor v. Insurance Co., 255.
43. It is for the judge to decide whether one is an expert and is not subject
to revision. Id.
EXECUTION.
1. A constable has such an interest in property upon which lie lis levied,
as enables him to maintain an action to recover possession, against a purchia-
ser after the levy. Rue v. Perry, 53.
2. The rule justifying the seizure of property under executions good on
their face, hut void for want of jurisdiction, is one of protection merely. Id.
3. An officer may defend under such process but cannot maintain an action
upon it. Id.
4. A house erected on ground held under a lease is not a separate chattel.
and cannot be severed f-mm the term on an execution. onklin v. Foster, 257.
5. A sheriff has no power to levy on and sell houses, timber, &c., and
sever them from the fee. Id.
6. Although a sale of a house situated on leased ground confers no titl*,
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still as it is a cloud on the title equity will take jurisdiction to remove the
cloud. Conklin v. Foster, 257.
7. A court of equity having acquired jurisdiction for any purpose will do
complete justice. Id.
8. A sheriff's sale of A.'s property on an execution against another vests
no title in the purchaser. Bryant v. Whitcer, 598.
9. The English rule of sales in market overt is not in force in New Hamp-
shire. Id.
10. In Vermont an officer is not liable for property attached on mesne pro-
cess, which has perished without his fault. .7de v. Fassitt, 730.
11. Nor is the receiptor for such property liable. Id.
12. Where the attaching officer agrees that the goods receipted for, are to
be delivered at the time and place of sale appointed by him, and makes no
appointment, he cannot sue on the receipt. Id.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 30.
1. An executor may bring a suit in a court of equity in his individual
right, against his coexecutors individually to compel the payment of a legacy.
Evans v. Evans, 190.
2. If the allegations in the bill are sufficient to bring the executors before
the court in their characters as executors, they need not be styled such. Id.
3. It is not necessary to make debtors of the decedent parties to a bill
against the executors by creditors or legatees. Id.
4. An administrator de bonis non, is only entitled to demand of the deceased
executor's representative such chattels or choses in action as were unconverted
and exist as they were at the death of the first testator. Carrick's Adminis-
tratrix v. Carrick's Executor, 460.
5. The presumption arising from lapse of 21 years that executor has filed
his account may be rebutted by actual proof, that he neither accounted nor
distributed. iNorris's Appeal, 787.
6. Executor is chargeable with simple interest on balances deposited in his
account at bank, and used for private purposes. Id.
7. But where he has used the money he may be charged more than com-
pound interest. Id.
8. Where he has purchased stock in his own name which has risen in price,
he is liable for the dividends and the market value at time of decree. Id.
9. Such purchase constitutes him a trustee of the estate. Id.
10. Such possession of stock by executor is not adverse, and the Statute of
Limitations does not apply. Id.
EXTRADITION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 11, 12.
FENCES. See RAILROAD, 12, 13.
It is no defence to an action for damages done to crops by hogs, in a town-
ship where the hog law is in force, that there was no legal and sufficient fence.
Wells v. Beal, 533.
FINES.
1. When a mortgage given to a building association stipulates for the pay-
ment of certain fines, equity should allow their collection in a suit to fore-
close. Shannon v. Howard Mutual Building Assoc., 187.
2. Such fines are not within the principle forbidding equity to enforce files
and penalties. Id.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.
1 In this action two questions must arise, the exclusive possession of the
piaintiff, and the invasion of his possession by the defendant. Jamison v.
Graham, 191.
2. If the premises are used jointly, it is error to instruct the jury that the
plaintiff may recover if he was in possession. .d.
3. It is not necessary that the plaintiff should have a pedis possessio to
maintain an action of forcible entry. Id.
4. One joint tenant cannot recover exclusive possession of the premises
against his co-tenant. Id.
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FORFEITURE. See OFFICE AND 0FFIOER, 8.
F! RAUD. See CounTs, 12.
1. A contract will not be rescinded on the ground of fraud or misrepre.
resentation in procuring it, unless upon clear and satisfactory proof. Murphy
v. Dunning, 121.
2. Where there is laches in setting up the fraud, until suit brought on the
contract, a finding that the fraud is unproven, will not be reversed, unless
upon a very clear and decided preponderance of evidence. Id.
3. Courts have power to set aside or vacate decrees of divorce for fraud or
imposition, as in the case of other judgments, and will exercise that power
where such fraud or imposition is clearly established. Adamsv. Adams, 236.
4. Where judgment-creditors sue to recover the value of property fraud-
ulently sold by their debtor, judgment cannot be rendered in their fIvor with.
out relief from valuation or appraisement laws. Whitehall v. Crawford, 661.
FRAUDS OF STATUTE. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 23.
1. Taking possession of premises under a parol agreement for their con-
veyance, will take the case out of the Statute of Frauds, but part payment
will not. Green and 11rife v. Richards, 56.
2. Where a number of articles are sold at an auction on separate bids, the
whole will be regarded as one contract, and if the aggregate price is above
$33, within the statute. .Ienness et al. v. Vendell, 57.
3. Delivery and acceptance of part of the goods will take the entire con-
tract from the operation of the statute. id.
4. Whether the sale was extended through more than one day or not. Id.
5. Where a contract is for an article coming under the general denomina-
tion of goods, wares, &c., it is within the statute, though the subject does
not then exist, but if what is contemplated is the peculiar skill or care of the
maker, it is not within the statute. Prescott v. Locke, 262.
6. A conveyance or mortgage for pre-existing debt, is not a valuable con-
sideration within the statute. Minyus v. Coandit, 465.
7. To constitute a payment within the meaning of the statute there must
be an actual transfer or delivery of the thing or money agreed to be given as
payment. l1'alrath v. Ingles, 600.
8. The statute requires it to be paid at the time of the contract, a delivery
afterwards will not do. Id.
9. G. held a note against S., and J. held a note against G. H., agreed by
parol with J. that if he would surrender his note against G., and take G.'s
note against S., he would pay it. lteld, that the contract was within the
Statute of Frauds. Crosby v. .'erolman, 661.
10. Delivery of goods to the vendee is not sufficient to take a case out ot
the statute, lie must accept and receive them. Gibbs v. Benjamin, 791.
GIFT. See INSOLVENT.
GROUND-RENT.
.1. Tile alienee of the grantee may maintain covenant against the alienee
of tile grantor of a ground-rent. Springer v. Phillips, 788.
2. A covenant to pay principal of rent after ten years does not lapse by
failure to demand it, and the rent becomes irredeemable. Id.
3. It will not be held irredeemable unless the intent of the parties is very
clear to make it so. .d.
4. An action for the principal is a demand, and the owner of the land
should prepare a release and bring the money into court, where his rights
will be protected. Id.
GUARANTY.
1. To recover against a guarantor the creditor must prove due diligence
against his debtor or his insolvency ; he need not prove both. oods v.
Sherman, 791.
2. Reasonable diligence is a question for tile jury. Id.
3. Ex vi termini a guaranty of a contract is a concurrent act and part of
the original. Id.
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HEIR. See ESTATES. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2.
ELIGHWAY.
1. An inaccuracy in describing the terminus of a highway, in a petition to
lay out, will not render the laying out of such highway invalid. Flanders
Y. Colebrook, 58.
2. The insufficiency of a highway, which will render a town liable for
injuries resulting therefrom, exists whenever the road is not a reasonably
safe and convenient one. Wheeler v. The Town of Westport, 122.
3. The question whether the highway was insufficient or out of repair is for
the jury. la.
4. The general acquaintance of the party injured with the obstructions
causing the injury will not necessarily prevent his recovery. Id.
5. Townships are not liable in their corporate capacity for failure to keep
highways in repair, where they are established merely as divisions of counties.
Bussell, Adm'r, v. Town of Steuben, 191.
6. The owner may recover damages from the county commissioners, for
injury to his carriage in consequence of the condition of the public roads.
Coun.- Commissioners v. Gibson, 255.
7. The right of action against the commissioners is not taken away by the
13th sect. of the Act of 1868, of faryland. Id.
8. A county is not liable for damages resulting from the vacation of a road
where it is done by the commissioners. Commissioners of Coffey v. Venard,
533.
9. Where the owners of land abutting on an alley have permitted its use
by the public, a dedication will be presumed, and the city will not be restrained
from improving it. City of Evansville v. Evans, 533.
10. Dedication may be shown by acts in pais. Id.
1I. A traveller who in meeting another turns to the left, and meets with
an injury in consequence of an obstruction on the left-Jhand side of the road,
may maintain an action against the town for damages. Gale v. Lisbon, 597.
12. Whether a cellar along the line of a public street, unprotected by a
suitable barrier, constitutes a defect, is a question for the jury. Stack v.
Portsmouth, 662.
13. A town is liable for damage occasioned by reason of the insufficiency
and want of repair of a private way which has been temporarily adopted in
the place of the highway rendered impassable by a freshet. Dickinson v.
Rockingham, 731.
H( MESTEAD. See STATUTES, 5.
1. The family homestead is the dwelling-place of the family. Barney v.
Leeds, 256.
2. A widower having a minor child residing with him is the "head of a
family," within the meaning of the Homestead Act of 1851. Id.
3. This right is not lost by the child arriving at majority. Id.
4. A debtor's right of homestead is not lost by his neglect to make applica-
tion to the officer having an execution to set it off to him. Id.
5. An execution may be extended upon real estate subject to the debtor's
right of homestead. Id.
6. The right of homestead before the same has been set off, is not such an
estate in land as will bar a writ of entry by a creditor who has levied on the
land. Id.
7. Where the creditor's levy is subject to the debtor's homestead, before the
right is set off, they are tenants in common. Id.
8. The benefits of the homestead law are not confined to an ownership in
fee, but attach to the house and lot of which 'the debtor is tenant for years.
Conklin v. Foster, 256.
9. The owner of a homestead though a judgment-debtor, can sell his home-
stead and the purchaser will take the title free of any lien. Id.
10. Under the statutes of Vermont the homestead of a debtor is exempt
from debts contracted after the deed is filed in the clerk's office, if the premises
are occupied at the time of attachment. Lamb v. Mason, 403.
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HuSBAND AND WIFE. See PLEADING, 18. WILL, 2. WITNESS, 9, 14.
I. Marriage, Divorce and Alimony. See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.
1. A marriage between slaves is made valid by the ratification of the parties
after they become free. Jones v. Jones, 191.
2. The children of such marriage are entitled to a share in an intestate
uncle's estate. Id.
3. A wife is bound to accompany her husband to such places as he may in
good faith determine to remove to for habitation or business, but he has no
right as a punishment forbad temper to bamsh his wife to a lonely place with-
out friends or society when he does not stay with her. Boyce v. Boyce, 465.
4. Such abandonment and separation will entitle her to a decree for support
and maintenance. Id.
5. By law a man is not justified in deserting his wife because she is extrava-
gant or lazy, or swears, or is sickly or fretful, or of violent temper, these
are not crimes but infirmities, which le undertakes to put up with. Ad.
6. Marriage, by the law of Missouri, is a civil contract, and no special cere-
mony is essential to its validity ; and the same law prevails in Illinois and
Tennessee. Iflabird v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 566.
7. Although at the time of the marriage ceremony, the pretended husband
had a wife living so that the marriage was void, yet if after the death of his
former wile the parties agreed by mutual present consent, given in good faith,
Lo become husband and wife, and cohabited as such thereafter, then from the
date of such consent there was a valid marriage, and tile wife would have an
insurable interest in the life of the husband, and could maintain an action
upon a policy upon his life. And the jury may find the fact of such subse-
quent marriage from the evidence of cohabitation, and reputation as man and
wife. Id.
8. In granting a divorce the court has the power to decree the custody of
the minor children. Bush v. Btush, 597.
9. Where there is property it is the duty of the court to make a reasonable
provision for the care of the children. Id.
10. Where the estate is the result of the accumulations of the husband and
wife, a fourth is not an unreasonable share for the wife. Id.
11. In an action of divorce by the husband on the ground of adultery, a
letter written by the alleged paramour which has been intercepted and never
reached the wife, is not admissible in evidence. Robby v. Hobby, 598.
II. Curtesy and Dower.
12. A wife may recover money on her contract to release her dower in
certain land. McAboy v. Johns, 403.
.11. Separate Estate of lVife.
13. The obligation of a married woman, except where her separate e3tate
is involved, is void. Hansell v. De l"itt, 58.
14. A married woman is not liable upon a promissory note signed by her
as.surety for another. Id.
15. The Act of 1849, New York, providing that any married woman may
convey real estate in the same manner as if she were unmarried, repeals the
act requiring their examination apart from their husbands. Richardson v.
Pulver, 123.
16. A married woman having a power of appointment over lands of which
the legal title is in a trustee, may execute an instrument desiring tle trustee
to convey to her, and acknowledge it apart from her husband. Id.
17. The validity of the execution is to be tested by the form of acknow-
ledgment requisite at the time. Id.
18. A married woman may purchase property from her husband, and if a
subsequent creditor of the husband seizes it, she may replevy. Fddis v.
Woolomes, 123.
19. An agreement to convey, by one married woman to another,,is inoper.
ative and void. Tunnard v. Littell, 323.
20. The husband of a married woman is a necessary party to a bill by her
next friend, for her separate estate. Id.
21. A conveyance by a husband for the use of his wife on the execution of
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articles of separation will not be set aside on account of the subsequent adul-
tvry of the wife. Dixen v. Dixen, 465.
22. A married woman is not liable upon any executory contract unless in
connection with her separate estate. Kidd v. Conway, 663.
23. Though a bond accompanying a mortgage is void it does not foll.sr
that the mortgage is also. Id.
24. A statement in a mortgage by a married woman that the mortgaged
premises are occupied by her as a dwelling, is a distinct allegation that they
are her separate estate. Id.
25. Where a married woman gives a mortgage on real estate the court
must assume that it is her separate estate. Id.
26. A conveyance by husband to wife in order to avoid being compelled to
support his pauper mother is good between the parties, and vests the property
in the wife. Roberts v. Lund, 731.
IV. Actions by and against Husband and Wife.
27. A husband may sue in his own name to enforce a contract made in re-
lation to his wife's property. Wilson v. Sands, 58.
28. A married woman may transfer her title to a promissory note with her
husband's consent, but she cannot be held liable on her endorsement. Moreau
et ux. v. Branson, 597.
29. In trover against a husband by wife's administrator, the defendant is
not a competent witness of anything which occurred prior to administrator's
appointment. Roberts v. Lund, 731.
30. The administrator can maintain any proper action against the husband
for the enforcement of wife's rights of property. Id.
!lPEACHMENT. See OFFxC A D OFpOER, 10.
INFANT. See RAILROAD, 26.
1. The payment of a judgment to the attorney of record of the prochein
ami of an infant, is a good discharge of the judgment and binding on the
infant. B. 4- 0. R. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 257.
2. A prochein ami is no party to the suit in the technical sense of the term,
but he may receive the amount of the judgment and enter satisfaction on the
record. Id.
3. The right of the prochein ami or his attorney is subordinate to that of a
regularly constituted guardian. Id.
4. An order of sale of an infant's land does not operate as a conversion of
it into assets, so as to prevent a judgment from operating as a lien. Shafner
Adm'r v. Briggs, 403.
5. The land of an infant may be sold on execution against him. Id.
INJUNCTION. See COMMON CARRIEs, 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 16, 17.
EASEMENT, 2. NUISANCE, 1. TAXATION, 2, 3.
1. The Attorney-General has the right to enjoin in equity an abuse of a
corporate franchise, as for instance, the payment of money by a municipal
corporation on a contract made in disregard of its charter. May v. City of
Detroit, 149.
2. But to warrant his interference the abuse must be one of a substantial
nature, and not one merely technical and unimportant. .d.
3. The aid of a court of equity by injunction is not a matter of right but
of grace. Huckenstine's Appeal, 405.
4. In questions of restraining a lawful business equity will consider the
customs of the people and the characteristics of their business. Id.
5. Injunction against a brick-kiln will not be granted, because it injures a
vineyard. Id.
6. A citizen who suffers a special injury from the obstruction of a street,
different from the public, is entitled to relief by injunction. B. 6. 0. R. B
v. Strauss, 731.
7. But if he suffers a public corporation to expend large sums of money (n
contravention of his rights, without complaint, he is precluded from such re-
lief. Id.
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INSANITY. See PLEADING, 14.
INSOLVENT. See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 11.
A father, acting in good faith, may make a valid gift to his minor son of
his time and future earnings, although insolvent at the time. Atwood v. Hol-
comb, 715.
INSURANCE.
1. Where the agent of the insured, being unacquainted with the premises,
signs an application in which they are described as a "three or four stwry
brick building," at the same time stating that he will send the insurers plats
of the building, and in such plats the building is stated as "first and second
story of brick," the insurers have sufficient notice to put them on inquiry,
and, the third story being of frame, cannot in case of loss claim that the
policy is void in law for misrepresentation of a material fact. Moods v. At-
lantic Mutual Ins. Co., 47.
2. In a suit on such policy, whether the insurance was to be left open until
the delivery of the plats, is a question of fact and as such belongs to the jury.
Id.
3. Whether the buildings in all material respects were such as described in
the policy is also a question of fact, and the court had no right to give a bind-
ing instruction to find for the insurers. Ill.
4. The clause in a policy that, "nothing but a distinct specific agreement
clearly expressed and endorsed on the policy shall operate as a waiver of any
condition or warranty therein," has no reference to stipulations which are to
be performed after a loss occurs. Franklin lire Ins. Co. v. Chicago Ice Co.,
58.
5. The term "builder's risk," in a policy does not refer to such repair? is
are indispensable to the proper conduct of the business to which a building is
appropriated. Id.
6. A person in possession claiming as owner, has a primd facie title in fee,
and a sufficient insurable interest Id.
7. Insurance may be effected in thc name of a nominal partnership where
the business is carried on by and for the use of one of the partners. Phrenix
Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 192.
8. Where no representations are made with regard to the persons who com-
pose the firm, there is no misrepresentation which will avoid the policy. Id.
9. Where defects in the proof of a lops are not made at the time, they will
be considered as waived. Taylor v. The Roger IVilliams Ins. Co., 258.
10. Where there are false representations in regard to proof there is no
waiver. Id.
11. Parol proof is not admissible to show that a policy of insurance does
not cover certain goods expressly mentioned. Hough v. ins. Co., 324.
12. A consignee of goods may insure them in his own name, anti in tne
event of loss recover the full amount 0f insurance, and after satisfying his
own claim, hold the balance as trustee for the owner. Id.
13. In applications for insurances on lives the statements of the assured
concerning his health or vital organs, are not understood or intended as war-
ranties. Horn v. The Amicable Mlutual Life Ins. Co., 466.
14. The applicant must state all that he knows bearing upon his health, and
any untrue statement or concealment ought to render the policy void. Id.
15. The mortgagee of a ship to whom a policy is assigned in blank, is en-
titled to receive the money in case of loss, in preference to an attaching
creditor. Ins. Co. of Penn. v. Phsanix Ins. Co., 788.
16. The transaction is an equitable transfer of the right to receive the
money, rather than an assignment of the policy. Id.
17. The condition against assignment in a marine policy, is for the insurer's
benefit, and may be waived. Id.
INTEREST. See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 6, 9; MORTGAGE, 12.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 7. USURY, 5.
Judgment that plaintiff may redeem land on payment of a sum found due,
should provide also for interest on the sum, to the time of payment. Fisk
v.-Brinette., 194.
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1. Where a forfeiture is made absolute by a statute, a decree of condemna-
tion relates back to the time of commission of the wrongful act. Henderson'1
Distilled Spirits, 123.
2. A removal of spirits from the place where they were distilled, to a bonded
warehouse of the United States, is not inconsistent with a scheme to defraud
the Government of the taxes. Id.
3. It is no answer to an information under the Act of July 13th 1866,
against a brewer for his neglect to keep the prescribed books, that it was from
ignorance. United States v. Foster, 466.
4. The penalty is for the omission and the very nature of his business de-
manded that he should know his duty. Id.
5. Nor is it any answer or excuse that he misconstrued the law. Id.
6. Where a law prescribes as punishment both a money penalty and im-
prisonment, the government can maintain an action of debt for the penalty.
Id.
7. The words "shall be liable," &c., are permissive and not compulsory,
and the amount of the penalty is discretionary. .d.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Though an alien enemy is incapable of maintaining a suit during hostilities,
he is liable to be sued if within reach of process. Dorsey v. Thompson, 732.
JOINT LIABILITY.
I. A joint action against seven cannot be maintained where there is nc
evidence as to three. Cooks v. Mackrell, 398.
2. Several parties having several rights against the same individual, cannot
join in an action of assumpsit against him. Woodward v. Sherman, 593.
JOINT TENANT. See FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, 4.
JUDGE. See OFFICE AND OFFICER, 7.
JUDGMENT. See EQUITY, 16; INFANT, 1 ; PARTNERSHIP, 26.
1. The original judgment or decree of a court having jurisdiction, cannot
be disturbed in a co-ordinate tribunal, nor in a collateral action. Amory v.
Amory, 38.
2. The decree of a state court having jurisdiction of a suit and of the
parties to it, is conclusive of the matters determined, and cannot be impeached
in the courts of the United States, nor of another state. Id.
* 3. The Circuit Courts of the United States are not constituted to review
and reverse the proceedings and judgments of state courts. It is the duty of
such courts to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings and records
of state tribunals. Id.
4. An action can be maintained on a domestic judgment in Kansas. .Burns
v. Simpson et al., 59.
5. It is not necessary to aver personal service in such action. Id.
6. A copy of the judgment should be filed with the petition, and the neglect
to do so must be taken advantage of by motion and not demurrer. 7d.
7. A judgment is strictly a contract, by specialty, but is not included in the
use of that word in the the 20th sec. of the Code of 1859. Id.
8. A void judgment may be set aside at any time on motion of the defend.
ant. Forman v. Scott, 60.
9. The judgment of another state will be presum.Id to be valid and binding
in that state, until the contrary is shown. French v. Pease, 123.
19. A judgment by default is conclusive of the question of jurisdiction.
Cooper v. Roche, 325.
11. Such judgment does not settle the right of the plaintiff to recover the
amount stated in the cause of action, the defendant is entitled to an inquisi-
tion. 1d.
12. No one is bound by a judgment or decree, as being privy thereto, unless
he derives his title to the property in question subsequent to, and from a party
bound by the judgment. Hunt v. Haven 4- A., Administrators, 592.
13. The aiding of another in a suit and employing and paying his counsel,
does not make one a privy to the suit. Id.
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JUDGMENT.
14. Where a judgment by default has been entered for too small a sum by
mistake, it may be corrected at a subsequent term, though it has been paid.
Sherman v. ixon et al., 598.
15. Where the docket of the justice does not sufficiently recite the judg-
ment, the premises cannot be restored. Wi~ckershain v. Corlew, 598.
JURY. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 15, 16 ; EVIDENCE, 19.
1. Parties have a right to waive a jury, independent of any legislative pro-
vision on the subject. Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 123.
2. A jury need not fix the value of personal property at the exact sum tes-
tified to by a witness. Jeffersonville v. Railroad Co., 663.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. See JUDGMENT, 15.
LACHES. See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 23, 25; WILL, 4.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See BANKRUPTCY, 21.
1. Where a tenant has acquired a right to continue the tenancy for another
year, equity will not oust him because he is insolvent, or disagreeable to the
landlord. Blain v. Everett, 60.
2. Where the relation of landlord and tenant exists, no presumption of ex-
tinguishment of landlord's right to rent, will arise from failure to demand it.
Lyon v. Adde, 258.
3. Acceptance of grant subject to rent then due, is such admission as
would rebut any presumption of law. Id.
4. No action will lie for distraining for more rent than is due and in arrear.
Hamilton v. Windolf, 286.
5. A parol agreement to terminate a lease under seal, without actual sur-
render is not sufficient. Wilson v. Lester et al., 598.
C. Nor will the acceptance of rent from the assignee have that effect. Id.
7. Notice to quit is never necessary unless the relation of landlord and
tenant exists. Chamberlin v. Donahue, 732.
8. If the tenant repudiates the relation notice is not necessary. Id.
9. An agreement to pay rent is essential'to a tenancy from year to year.
in.
10. A tenancy at will may be terminated by any act inconsistent with the
relation of landlord and tenant. Id.
11. The commencement of an action of ejectment determines the relation
of a tenant at will, and his possession is thenceforth wrongful. Id. .
LEASE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 5.
1. The assignee of a lease containing a stipulation to sell at a fixed price,
is entitled to a conveyance. Napier v. Darlington, 407.
2. Such stipulation is not a personal covenant, but a right which may be
transferred. 1d.
3. It was a continuing offer to sell, and when accepted the contract was
complete. Id.
LEGAL EDUCATION. LEGAL EDUCATION, 65, 265, 409.
LEGAL TENDER.
1. The measure of damages for a cargo, shipped from a port where gold
was 101 per cent. above legal tender notes, is the value of the cargo in gold
the day of shipment, converted into legal tender notes at the rate they stood
at the day of shipment. The Vaughan and Telegraph, 123.
2. THE LEGAL TENDER CASES. WHAT THEY DECIDE, 601.
LICENSE. See ATTORNEY, 3. TRESPASS, 2.
1. To do certain acts on land conveys no interest in the land. Blaisdell
v. G. F. 4 .. R. R., 258.
2. So far as it not executed a license may be revoked. Id.
3. A license to build a railroad over land excuses all acts properly done
under it. Id.
4. Possession under a license cannot be adverse. Td.
5. Decease of either party to a license is a revocation. Id.
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LIEN. See ATTORNEY, 2. PARTIERasIPn 23. SALE, 1.
LIMITATIONS. See COVENANT, 4. EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 10.
1. It requires the same time to bar a suit upon a coupon as it does on the
bond. Lexington v. Butler, 125.
2. The statute will not run against a tax deed which is void upon its face.
Hubbard v. Johnson, 126.
3. Silence on the part of the party liable, after an action accrues, is not of
itself sufficient to avoid the statute. Stanley v. Stanton, 404.
4. A bill to revive a suit in equity, founded on a judgment obtained more
than twenty years previously, will be dismissed. Bird's Administratrix v.
lasler's Executrix, 466.
5. 'Where the facts stated in the bill show that the claim is barred by the
Statute of Limitations, advantage of it may be taken by demurrer. Id.
6. In equity the Statute of Limitations may be set up by plea, answer or
demurrer. Ruckman v. Decker, 469.
7. The statute will run against a claim unless the debtor is both absent
from and residing out of the state. Bell v. Lampreg, 533.
8. He may have his legal residence out of the state and yet be present,
within the meaning of the provision. Id.
9. When the creditor cannot make legal service, the statute will not run.
Id.
10. The statute begins to run against a note payable by instalments as each
instalment becomes due. Bush v. Stowell, 733.
11. A payment by one of several joint debtors will not avoid the bar as to
the others. Id.
LIS PENDENS.
I. Is not notice to anybody to affect or operate upon existing rights. Hung
v. Haven 4- A., Administrators, 593.
2. In equity the purchase of property pendente lite from a party to the suit,
is held to be notice to the purchaser. Id.
LOCAL OPTION. See CONSTITUTIONAx LAW, 2, 6e
LOTTERY. See EQUITY, 11.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. An acquittal and discharge after full investigation by a magistrate, are
privd facie evidence of want of probable cause, and throw the burden of
proof on the defendant. Straus v. Young, 192.
2. Malice may be inferred from want of probable cause. Id.
3. Malice may be inferred from the zeal and activity of the defendant in
conducting the prosecution. Id.
4. Evidence that party acted under advice of magistrate or person not
learned in the law, is inadmissible to show the absence of malice. Id.
5. If the jury find that the prosecution originated without probable cause,
and if pursued was persisted in for some private end, they may give punitive
damages. Cooper v. Utterbach, 789.
6. In order to relieve himself from liability the defendant must show that
he acted without malice under legal advice upon a full disclosure of all the
facts to his counsel. Id.
7. Probable cause means the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that the plaintiff was guilty -C
the crime for which he was prosecuted. Id.
8. Where there is want of probable cause the jury- may infer malice. Id.
MANDAMUS. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 11.
1. Will not lie by private citizen to compel performance ot public duty.
Bobbett v. The State, 124.
2. Where private citizen sues he must show an interest specific and peculiar
in himself. Id.
3. Voters and freeholders have no such specific interest as will sustain
mandamus to compel county board to order election. Turner v. 2e Countj
Commissioners, 125.
MARRIAGE. See H'ISBAND AND WIFE, I.
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MASTER AND SERVANT.
1. Where a servant, well knowing the default of his principal, as in pro
riding defective machinery, voluntarily enters upon, or continues in employ-
ment. he assumes the risk, and], if injured, has no remedy against his
employer. Devitt v. Pacific R. j. Co., 104.
2. A master is liable for the results of the wilful conduct of his servant,
if within the scope of his authority. Passenger Railway Co. v. Donahue, 404.
3. The conductor or driver of a car may strike a blow where by resistance
to proper authority it becomes necessary without being liable therefor. Id.
4. Evidence to show the extent of damage occasioned by a servant's leaving
his employer's service before the expiration of his term, is inadmissible in an
action for work and labor. Blodgett v. Berlin Mills Co., 661.
5. Breach of performance by the employee of the contract of hiring may be
shown by the employer in defence pro tanto to an action for wages. Id.
6. A servant cannot recover from his employer for injuries resulting from
the unskilfulness of his fellow-servants. Haskin Adm'r v. N. Y. C. Rail-
road, 663.
MECHANICS AND MATERIAL-MEN. See MORTGAGE, 26, 27.
1. A material-man furnishing supplies to a domestic vessel in a home port
has no lien by the general maritime law. Steamship Circassian, 291.
2. Such a lien may exist by the law of the state where the supplies are fur-
nished, but it can be enforced in rem only by the United States courts. Id.
3. Where such a lien exikts by the local law, it may now, under admiralty
rule 12, as amended in 1872, be enforced by the United States courts by a
libel in rem. rd.
4. But that amended rule does not apply to cases where the supplies were
furnished before the amendment went into effect. Id.
5. History of Rule 12, and the decisions under it. Id.
6. Ship carpenters have a lien for repair made to a domestic vessel which
may be enforced by a proceeding in rein. In re Kirkland, Chase 4- Co., 300.
7. The " Rules of Practice," of the Supreme Court in Admiralty proceed-
ings, are merely intended to regulate the remedy, and have no relation to the
question of jurisdiction. .d.
8. The amendment to the 12th Rule, providing that material-men furnishing
supplies or repairs may proceed against the ship and freight in ren, is appli-
cable to all suits instituted since May 1872, for supplies or repairs, no matter
whether they were furnished before or since the adoption of the amendment.
Id.
9. The owner of land who has sold subsequently to the contract for work
is not a necessary party in a suit to enforce a mechanics' lien for labor. Kel-
lenberger v. Boyer, 663.
10. The lien of the mechanic relates to the time when the work com-
menced. Id.
MERGER.
1. Is not favored in equity, and is never allowed unless for special reasons
and to promote the intention of the party. Cios et al. v. Boppe, 60.
2. Where the equities are subserved by keeping a mortgage alive and no
injustice is wrought, it will not be extinguished. Id.
MORTGAGE. See ATTACHMENT, 2; CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2; FINES, 1; IN-
SURANCE, 15; MERGER, 2 ; PARTNERUSIP, 25.
I. lh at constitutes, and rights and liabilities of parties.
1. A mortgagee holding two notes secured by one mortgage can transfer
one note "nd the mortgage so as to give the note priority in satisfaction.
Noges v. 1hite et al., 60.
2. An assignee of a mortgage takes it subject to all the equities to which
it was liable in the hands of his assignee. Kaniend v. Hnelbiq, 61.
3. A mortgagor paying a note for which the mortgage has been pledged as
reurity, is subrogated to the place of the payor. Id.
4. If a receipt in full of the payee's claim is taken on the mortgage, the
m:rtgagor is entitled to a credit for the full amount, although a dedueti.,u
was allowed by payee. .d.
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5. It does not require a written instrument to assign a bond even at law,
delivery of bond and mortgage is sufficient. Kamend v. Huelbig, 61.
6. That the maker of the note, pledging a mortgage as security, is a married
woman makes no difference, her kusband being present and approving. Id.
7. The non-delivery of the mortgage at the time of the assignment, is
notice to assignee that it is held by some one as owner or claimant. Id.
8. A seal is not necessary to a mortgage of chattels under the lawi of
Ohio. Gibson v. Warden, 119.
9. The oath of the grantor is not sufficient to change a deed absolute on its
face into a mortgage. Freytag v. Holland, 193.
10. Where the grantee admits that he required an absolute deed as security
for a debt, without any recital to show what the debt was, the burden of proof
is on the grantee to show that it was greater than the consideration mentioned
in the deed. Id.
11. The grantee must reconvey on payment of his debt, and if the rents
and profits exceed the amount must repay the excess. Id.
12. Where one holds the legal title as security, and purchases the tax cer-
tificates, he holds those in trust also, and is entitled to interest on their
amount. Fisk v. Brunette, 194.
13. A chattel mortgage is required to be recorded only when mortgagor
retains possession. Miorrow v. Reed et al., 194.
14. All irregularities in recording a mortgage or describing property are
cured by subsequent delivery of property to mortgagee, before other parties
have acquired rights. Zd.
15. Such delivery must be an actual transfer. Id.
16. Where the property is too bulky it is sufficient if mortgagor points it
out to the mortgagee, and thereby transfers it as the property described. Id.
17. A mortgage given to secure a wife the capital she had contributed to a
firm of which she had been a member, end which was insolvent before she
left, is void against the creditors of the firm. Wheeler v. Kirtland, 321.
18. A mortgage given by a father to secure his son's money used in a firm,
though the firm was insolvent when it was given, is valid. Id.
19. Where the property in a chattel mortgage is correctly described, the
misdescription of the ground on which it is situated is immaterial. Spauld-
ing v. Mozier, 325.
20. In such cases parol evidence is admissible to establish the identity of
the property. Id.,
21. An agreement that the mortgagor may sell part of the mortgaged chat-
tels on his own account renders the mortgage void as to creditors. Putnam
v. Osgood, 598.
22. A chattel mortgage which provides that it is to be a continuing lien
upon certain goods in a store, and when they are sold upon such others as
replace them, is clearly fraudulent as against creditors, upon its face. Yates
v. Olmsted, Adm'r., 658.
23 Under such a mortgage an agreement that the mortgagor shall continue
to sell the goods mortgaged, and that the business shall proceed as before the
mortgage was given, may be fairly implied.
I1. Its lien, Sc.
24. To secure future advances is valid under the Code of Maryland.
Brooks v. Lester, 259.
25. The fact that the advances are to be in materials instead of money
does not affect its validity. Id.
26. To give a mortgage priority over mechanics' liens the mortgage mus,
be recorded before building is commenced. 1d.
27. The commencement of a building under Mechanics' Lien Law, is first
labor done on the ground. Id.
28. A mortgage reformed by substituting "heirs" for "successors" will
nor affect a subsequent judgment, if the record at the time showed it to be a
mortgage for life only. Wheeler v. Kirtland, 321.
29. Takes effect from time of delivery. Miilliken v. Ham, 407.
30. A mortgage of land to A., the mortgagor's father, who is the real
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owner of the land, to secure the payment of an annual sum, will be neld
posterior in equity to a mortgage of later date given to secure the payment
of joint notes made by the mortgagor and A. Kacher v. Dibble et al., 464.
31. The later mortgage will also be prior in equity to one of earlier date
given at A.'s request as an advancement tojis other children. Id.
32. In a contest between mortgagees the clause creating the lien must pre-
vail. Ripley v. Harris, 467.
33. The mortgage first recorded has the prior lien. Id.
34. Mortgage to secure future advances is Valid, but will not secure ad-
vances made after actual notice of a subsequent mortgage. Id.
III. Proceedings on.
35. Though a sale, by the agent of the trustee under a deed of trust, in
the ahsence of the trustee is illegal, the sale cannot be questioned by one
holding simply the legal title. Beach v. Shaw, 193.
36. Where a junior mortgagee purchases the property at a trust sale and
enters into possession, he cannot be disturbed "by a holder of legal title sim-
ply. Id.
37. As a general rule the holder of the legal estate under the mortgagor
may redeem, but where he asks to do more than redeem, to set aside a pre-
vious sale, fairly made, he must show that lie has equities before he can be
allowed to redeem. 1d.
38. It is perfectly legal for a mortgagee to foreclose for the use of another
person. Winchell v. Edwards, 325.
39. The heirs of a defendant to such a proceeding arc privies, and concluded
by the judgment. Id.
40. Though the execution be valid and describe the land properly, a selling
e, inasse instead of in parcels, is irregular, and entitles defendant to set aside
the sale. Id.
41. Where the defendant is present at the sale and takes no steps for nearly
a year, he will be presumed to have acquiesced. Id.
42. The grandchildren of a mortgagor who devises his estate to his child-
ren, remainder to his grandchildren, should be made parties to a suit of fore-
closure. Legqett v. The Mutual Life ts. Co., 408.
43. The insolvency of the estate of the mortgagor does not affect the ques-
tion. Id.
44. The trustees under the will of the grandfathcr could not represent the
future estate of the grandchildren in such suit. Id.
45. It is a good defence to a suit on a mortgage that the defendant was so
intoxicated at the time of signing, as to be incapable of executing it. Reins-
ko1f v. Rogge, 531.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.
1. A bond fide holder of municipal securities, may presume they were issued
properly, if the municipality has the right to issue under any circumstances.
Lexingt6n v. Butler, 125.
2. Are not liable for consequential damages resulting from laying out or
opening and grading streets,where the work is done with proper care and with-
out malice. Citq of Delphi v. Erans, 326.
3. Where the land of a citizen is appropriated and actually used in such im-
provements, his damages must be first assessed and tendered. Id.
MURDER. See CRI31INAL LAW, I.
NAVIGATION. See ADMIRALTY, 5, 6 ; RIPARIAN OWNER, 2, 3 RIVER,
6, 7.
NE(?LIGENCE. See AGENT, 6 ; RAILROAD, 15, 19, 26, 27.
1. Where an injury results from want of care and caut':,n on the part of
the agents of a railroad company, the company will be liable in damages,
thou0 the party in~iured failed to exercise ordinary prudence. B. 6- 0.
R. R. v. State to use of Dougherty, 259.
2. In considering the question of ordinary prudence on the part of a person
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killed on a railroad track, the jury have a right to consider the ordinary dis-
position of men to guard themselves from danger. B. 6- 0. R. R. v. State
to use of Dougherty, 259.
3. If the proximate cause of injury was the negligence of the company's
agents, the company is liable, though the remote cause was want of prudence
on the part of the injured person. Id.
4. The owner of land is not liable for the negligence of one who contracts
to clear the land. Wright v. Holbrook, 663.
5. Carrying a pressure of steam in excess of the amount allowed by the
government certificate under the Act of February 28th 1871, is sufficient evi-
deuce of negligence to warrant a jury in so finding. Carroll v. Staten Island
Railroad, 664.
6. The rule is the same in cases of negligence as in other cases. If plain-
tiff's own evidence establishes a defence before he rests he must rebut, or he
will be nonsuited. Robinson v. N. Y. C. Railroad, 664.
7. Contributory negligence is matter of defence and is not to be affirma.
tively disproved in order to entitle the injured party to recover. Id.
8. A person who is injured by another's negligence is not responsible for the
contributory negligence of a third person with whom he happens to be. Id.
NEW TRIAL. See PRAOTIoE, 5, 11.
1. If no error was committed upon the trial of a feigned issue, the verdict
being against the weight of the evidence is no ground for a new trial. Mc-
Kinley v. Lamb, 597.
2. The verdict of a jury should not be interfered with if there was no error
of law on the part of the court. Id.
3. Will not be granted on the ground that a record had been admitted in
evidence without being properly authenticated, if the proper evidence of its
authentication is furnished to the court. Hutchins v. Gerrish, 661.
NOTICE. See PARTHERSHIP, 6.
When the legislature provides for constructive notice on absent debtors,
such notice if given, is sufficient to give the courts jurisdiction and their judg-
ment will be sustained. Thomas v. Mahone, 433.
N"ISANCE. See EQuip', 15; RTPA.xAN OWITER, 6.
1. It is sufficient to sustain an injunction, that the gases generated by de-
fendant's business are so offensive and disagreeable as to render life uncom-
fortable. Meigs v. Leister, 62.
2. That the nuisance is not constant does not affect the right of the com-
plainant to protection. Id.
3. If the fact of the nuisance is free-from doubt a delay of several months
will not prevent relief by injunction. Id.
4. Several nuisances cannot be joined in one suit. Id.
5. The liability for a nuisance is not restricted to persons wo occasion the
whole of it. The Chenango Bridge Co. v. Lewis et al., 260.
6. Where the nuisance is not only the use, but also the erection of the
structure, the liability attaches to those who caused the erection. Id.
7. The rule that the creator of a nuisance is liable for its continuance, is
subject to an exception, where he is not in possession. Id.
8. In an action to recover damages for maintenance of a mill-dam as a
nuisance, and to abate the same, evidence to aid the court in determining
whether it should be abated, is admissible, which should have no effect on the
question of damages. Maxwell v. Boyne, 326.
9. The abatement of a private nuisance is a matter of legal discretion. Id.
10. A gas company is not liable to indictment for creating a nuisance,
where it is conceded that its process is the best and that it has used due care
in the business. The People v. The New York Gas Light Co., 399.
11. Although it may be that private persons can maintain an action, the
people are barred by the act of legislature incorporating the company. Id.
12. Making a speech in a public street is not per se a nuibance. Fairbanks
v. Kerr, 401.
13. Brickmaking is not a nisance per se. iluckenstine's Appeal, 405.
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14. Though a useful employment may produce discomfort to those near it,
it is not therefora to be restrained. Huckenstfne's Appeal, 405.
OFFICE AND OFFICER. See EQUITY, 26. EXECUTION, 10.
1. Special commissioners appointed to act upon a single petition for a
highway, are so far public officers, that they must take the oath of allegiance
prescribed by the Constitution of New Hampshire. lentworth v. .'arming-
ton, 62.
2. An objection that such officers were not duly qualified is good any time
before their report is accepted. Id.
3. It is not necessary in all cases, in order that the acts of one acting as an
officer without legal right, may be holden valid as to the public and third
persons, as the acts of an officer defacto, that he should have color of election
or appointment by the only body which has power to elect or appoint him, or
that the appointing or electing body should in all cases possess the legal
power. State v. Carroll, 165.
4. The expression used in the opinion of the court in Douglas v. Wicksire,
19 Conn. 492, that " it is enough if the officer acts under color of an election
or appointment by the only body which has power to make it," if intended as
a general definition, is inaccurate, and the definition given in Plymouth v.
Painter, that an officer de facto is one who exercises the duties of an office
under color of appointment or election to that office, is not sufficiently com-
prehensive. Id.
5. From a general review of the English and American authorities upon
the point, it appears that a definition, in order to be sufficiently comprehensive
and accurate as a general one, must be substantially as follows: An officer
defacto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid, so far as they involve the
interests of the public and third persons, wlere the duties of the office were
exercised, 1. Without a known appointment or election, but under such cir-
cumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people
without inquiry to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to be the
officer he assumed to be. 2. Under color of a known and valid appointment
or election, but where the officer has failed to coiform to some precedent re-
quirement or condition, as to take an oath, give a bond, or the like. 3. Under
color of a known election or appointment, void, because the officer was not
eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing
body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligi-
bility, want of power, or defect, being unkilown to the public. 4. Under
color of an election or appointment by or pursuant to a public, unconstitu-
tional law, before the same is adjudged to be such. Id.
6. The acts of an officer appointed by and acting under and pursuant to an
unconstitutional law, performed before the unconstitutionality of the law has
been judicially determined, are valid, as respects the public and third persons,
as the acts of an officer de.facto. Id.
7. Where the Constitution prescribed that the judges of the Supreme,
Superior and inferior courts should be elected by the General Assembly, and
a judge of a city court was so elected, and it was further provided by law
that in case of his sickness or absence a justice of the peace should be called
in by the clerk to hold the court as acting judge during such temporary sick-
ness or absence, and a justice of the peace was so called in and acted, it was
holden that whether the law was constitutional or not, and whether the call
had been recorded according to law or not, he was an officer de facto, if not
dejure, and judgments rendered by him were valid. Id.
8. Conviction of an infamous crime does not ipso facto work such a for-
feiture of public office as to make the office vacant. The State v. Pritrhard,
514.
9. The right to remove a state officer for misbehavior in office does not
&ppertain to the executive. Id.
10. Such act is judicial and belongs to the Court of Impeachments. Id.
11. Certain police commissioners of Jersey City, appointed by statute,
having been convicted upon indictment of conspiracy to cheat the city and the
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governor having declared their offices to be thereby vacated, and having ap-
pointed their successors, held that such executive action was illegal and void.
The State v. Pritchard, 514.
12. Process regular on its face from a court having jurisdiction, protects
an officer executing it. Wickersham v. Corlew, 534.
13. Such protection extends to persons assisting the officer. Id.
14. The plaintiff must show a regular and valid judgment however. Id.
OUSTER. See REAL ESTATE, 1.
?A RENT AND CHILD. See DECEDENT'S ESTATE, 1; INSOLVENT; RAILROAD,
27.
PARTNERSHIP. See BILLS AND NOTES, 10; CORPORATION, 24; DEED, 1.
EVIDENCE, 15, 29.
1. Land bought with partnership funds will be treated as partnership pro-
perty. Deveney v. .ifahoney, 63.
2. The same rule applies to improvements made with partnership funds on
the separate property of a partner. Id.
3. It is not necessary that a judgment should be first obtained against the
partner in whose name the property is vested, before a bill in equity can be
maintained for an account, and to have the property declared partnership
assets. Id.
4. The rule that a fraudulent transfer of property can only be contested by
a judgment-creditor does not apply. .d.
5. Articles of partnership are not evidence of the day it was formed, in an
issue between the partnership and third parties. Philpot v. Gruninger, 188.
6. Notes made by one partner in the name of the firm after dissolution, of
which no notice was published, are binding on the other partners in the hands
of bontfide holders for value, without notice of the dissolution. Taylor v.
Hill, 260.
7. A deed to persons as tenants in common, who are partners, must govern
as to purchasers and creditors in distributing the proceeds of a sale of the
title. Ebbert's Appeal, 405.
8. As to creditors the effect of such a deed cannot be changed by parol evi-
dence. Id.
9. As to the partners the lands may be assets of the partnership. Id.
10. Partners can direct the application of firm funds and secure their iden-
tity in the kind of title they take. Id.
11. Where a purchase of goods is made by a firm which it is stated will be
formed at some future time, the purchase itself constitutes a quasi partnership.
Stiles v. Meyer, 405.
12. To charge a secret partner, it is necessary to show that the debt was
contracted in the name and business of the firm, and that he had an interest
in the profits. it re Munn, 461.
13. Where the purchaser of a note did not know that there were any secret
partners, they would not be liable. .d.
14. The fact that the purchaser afterwards proved his claim in bankruptcy
against the signers of the note alone, goes to prove that he discounted on
their liability. .d.
15. Circumstances under which dormant partners are not liable. Id.
16. An agreement between R. and W. to plant and sell oysters, each v
have one-half the net profits, is a partnership. Ruckman v. Decker, 468.
17. On the termination of the partnership, the personal property remaining
tn their possession, is held in common, and one cannot dispose of the other's
share without his consent. Id.
18. The admissions of one partner are evidence against the others in a bill
against all for partnership liabilities. Id.
19. Real estate purchased by a partnership for partnership purposes, and
paid for with partnershio funds, as to the creditors of the firm is, in equity,
treated as personal property, and will, if necessary, be subjected to the pay-
ment of their debts, whether the title be conveyed to the partners by name,
or to one of them, or to a third person. Offatt e al. v. Scott, 575.
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20. In case of the death of one partner, the survivor is a trustee for all
persons interested in the partnership, for tlhe creditors of the firm, for the
representatives of the deceased partner or his heirs, and for himself; and for
the purpose of closing up the business of the firm, he is invested with the
exclusive right of possession and management of the whole partnership pro-
perty and business. Offuti et al. v. Scott, 575.
21. If goods shippsd and consigned to a firm doing a commission busin.ss.
to be sold on account of the shipper, are received, but before they are scld
one of the partners dies, the survivor may sell such goods, and, in such case,
the claim of the shipper on account of such sale is properly against the firm,
and not against the survivor individually. Zd.
22. If a surviving partner sell and convey his interest in the real estate
belonging to the partnership to a bond fide purchaser for valuable considera-
tion, without notice, before a creditor of the firm has acquired a lien on the
same by bill filed to subject it to the payment of his debt, the purchaser will
hold it against the general equity of the creditors to have it appropriated to
the payment of the partnership debts. Id.
23. One partner cannot set off a claim due him inlividually by a bank, in
an action by the receiver of the bank to compel the payment of moneys collected
by the firm as attorneys of the bank. Bowling Green Savings Bank v. Todd
et al., 593.
24. Nor has he any lien upon the papers on which a foreclosure suit is
brought, for his individual claim. Id.
25. A mortgage executed by one of the mejnbers of a firm in his own name
but for the firm, and upon property held in his name but in trust for the firm,
with this agreement in it, " He assuming the payment of certain notes given
for the purchase-money of the land," is the joint contract of all the partners
and not the several contract of each. Crosby v. Jerolman, 665.
26. A judgment of foreclosure on the mortgage against the one member,
is a bar to any suit against his partners who were jointly liable. Id.
27. When an incoming partner assumes the share of the liabilities of the
firm belonging to an outgoing partner, it is a contract to indemnify such out-
going partner. Coleman v. Lanning, 665.
28. The rule for the application of payments is that they are to be applied
to the earliest items in the account. 1d.
29. If one suffers another to hold him out as a partner os use his name in
business, he will be liable as such. Smitht v. Hill, 733.
30. Where B. sold part of a coal-lease to Al., who constituted 0. his at-
torney, and B. drew orders for goods on B. & Co., which were accepted by
0., it is evidence of a partnership between B. and M. Thomas v. lloore,
734.
31. Assumpsit does not lie between partners until a settlement is made and
a balance struck. Leidy v. Messinger, 734.
32. Partnership accounts must be settled in one proceeding, by account
render or hill in equity. Id.
33. Without an express promise to repay, assumpsit will not lie for advances
between partners, until there has been a settlement. Id.
34. This rule applies whether the partnership property exists or not. Id.
PARTY-WALL. See EqusTY, 22; TnESPASS, I.
FASSENGER. See RAILROAD, 5.
1. The plaintiff purchased of the defendants a commutation ticket, which
conferred upon him the right to ride in the cars upon the defendants' railroad
between the city of New York and the town of Westpoirt during the ensuing
year, upon certain conditions. One of the condition, was that the ticket
should be shown to conductors when requested, or wn required by Ihe rules
of the company. One of the company's rules in force during the year re-
quired commuters to show their tickets to conductors when required, in the
same manner as other passengers. At the time of purchasing the ticket the
plaintiff signed a receipt containing similar conditions. During the year,
while the plaintiff was riding in tlh defendants' cars between New York and
Westport, he was requested by the conductor to show his ticket. The plain-
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tiff had his ticket upon his person, but was unable to find it at the time, and
so informed the conductor. The conductor knew that the plaintiff was a com-
muter, and that the time covered by his ticket had not expired, but acting
in accordance with the instructions of the defendants, he demanded of the
plaintiff his fare for the trip, and on his refusal to pay it ejected him from the
train. Maples v. N. Y?. 4- N. H. Railroad Co., 231.
2. Held, that the plaintiff was not bound to produce his ticket immediately
when requested, but was entitled to a reasonable time to find it, and was en-
titled to ride as long as there was any reasonable expectation of finding it
during the trip ; that under the circumstances the production of his ticket by
the plaintiff was the merest formality, and that in the absence of an express
stipulation in the contract that the plaintiff should pay the fare of the passage
unless the ticket should be produced, his failure to produce the ticket was not
such a breach of the contract as to justify the defendants in rescinding it, and
treating the plaintiff as a trespasser on the train ; and that if the defendants
had a right to eject the plaintiff from the train, they had no right to do so
elsewhere than at a regular station on the road-that any rule or regulation
of the defendants which required or allowed such an act to be done between
stations to a person in the condition of the plaintiff was unreasonable and
void. fid.
PAYMENT. See FRAUDs OF STATUTE, 7; INFANT, 1; LIMITATIONS, 11.
1. There is an absolute presumption of payment of an instrument which
can be extinguished by an act in pais, after the lapse of twenty years. Lyon
v. Adde, 261.
2. This is a presumption of law and can only be rebutted by an unequivo-
cal admission. Id.
3. A presumption of fact may be drawn by the jury from the circumstances
in less than twenty years. Id.
4. Where the obligation can only be extinguished by deed the rule is dif-
ferent. Id.
5. Where the relation of landlord and tenant exists any release of the rent
must be by deed-no presumption of payment arises from lapse of time. id.
PERSONAL PROPERTY.
Title and possession of personal property is all that is required to enable
the holder to claim the property or its value. Orr v. The May/or, 4-c., of New
York, 469.
PHYSICIAN. See COUNTY; RAILROAD, 3.
PLEADING. See CommoN CARRIER, 12; COVENA, 2; JUDG E NT, 5;
LIMITATIoN, 5.
1. Demurrer lo a replication denying notice, admits want of notice. Lex-
ington v. Butler, 125.
2. An averment that the defendant agreed to pay five per cent. on sale of
a mill, is not sustained by proof, that defendant agreed to pay if mill sold for
$5000. Afen!fee v. Higgins, 261.
3. An allegation in a common count of an indebtedness of $500 for com-
missions on sale of land and mill, is not sustained by evidence of exchange
of mill and land for other property. Id.
4. A plea of justification of imprisonment, under order of court, should
set forth all the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. Von Ketler v.
Johnson, 323.
5. Where a plea of usury avers the payment of $150, and the evidence
shows but $125, it is such a variance as renders the evidence inadmissible.
Frank v. Aforris, 327.
6. At common law, as usury rendered the contract void, it could be proved
under the plea of " non assumpsit," but under the statute it must be pieaded
specially. .d.
7. Where the error alleged is in arresting judgment, the Supreme Coue
will not look to the testimony for aid in pronouncing judgment. Aronsor v
C. 4- P. Railroad Co., 406.
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8. If the declaration is sound the plaintiff is generally entitled to judg
ment. Aronson v. C. 4- P. Railroad Co., 406.
9. Where declaration is against defendants for loss of goods as carriers,
after verdict it will be presumed that this was made out. Id.
10. Plaintiff would be estopped in another action against them as ware-
housemen. Id.
11. A replication to a plea of insolvency will be bad on demurrer, which
)oes not specify the time, place and circumstances under which acts charged
were committed. Bell v. Lamprey, 534.
12. The rule that on a demurrer judgment must be rendered against the
party making the first defect, applies to defects of substance and not of form.
Id.
13. The defect must be in the line of pleadings in which the demurrer is
interposed. Id.
14. Where a complaint seeks relief from a transaction, on the ground of
unsoundness of mind, when it was made and there is no averment of restora-
tion to soundness, the objection will be held as waived, unless the want of
capacity is presented by demurrer or answer. Wade v. The State ex rel. Aix,
534.
15. A plea of former adjudication is good on demurrer. State ex rel.
Combs v. Hudson, 597.
16. Plaintiff may show that no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant
was acquired by proper service, in the former action. Td.
17. A replication to be bad for duplicity must set up two or more answers
to the matter relied on as a defence. Hunt v. Haven, 598.
18. A declaration against a married woman on a note, allegipg that it was
made by her and her husband jointly who is since dead, is bad on demurrer,
it must show that she was liable independent of her coverture. Wellcome v.
Riley, 599.
19. A petition which groups together the principal facts constituting 670
separate causes of action, and alleges such facts in general terms, is bad.
Stewart v. Balderson, 734.
20. Such a petition does not nor does any count state facts sufficiently well
pleaded, to constitute a cause of action. d.
21. A motion asking to have such petition made definite should be sus-
tained. Id.
22. On demurrer to such petition the facts are not to be taken as true unless
they are well pleaded. Id.
PRACTICE.
1. If the plaintiff makes out a case upon which he can go to the jury, the
court has no right after the defence is in, to assume it to be true, and require
the jury to find for the defendant. Woods v, Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 47.
2. An endorser of the writ of a non-resident is not released by the plaintiff
beconing a resident of the state. Heywood v. Benton, 54.
3. A return of non est inventus, procured by the defendant in bad faith, is
not such a return as will fix the endorser. Id.
4. Where a party under the Code of Maryland elects to be tried by the
court instead of by a jury, unless he is determined to be guilty or not guilty,
there can be no judgment either of conviction or acquittal. League v. State,
196.
5. Where the court fail to agree the prisoner is in the same position as if
fmere had been no trial, and a re-trial must be had. Id.
6. The section of the Maryland Code giving the clerk of a court the right
to satisfy a judgment upon the order in writing of the plaintiff or his attorney.
was not designed to affect the question of the attoruty's authority to give the
order. B. 6- 0. R. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 257.
7. A variance between the statements of the hill and the proof, if not of
such a character as to operate as a surprise to the defendants, and the defend-
ants do not appear to be thereby injured, should generally be held to be im-
material. Off tt v. Scott, 575.
8. In a feigned issue the facts are expressly for the jury, and questions of
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law should be submitted to the court on application for judgment on the ver-
dict. McKinley v. Lamb, 597.
9. A material fact in a suit either at law or in equity cannot be put in issue
by a notice that it will be contested at the trial ; it must be regularly pleaded.
Hudson v. Bingham, 637.
10. The counsel of a prisoner cannot assail the charge of the court upon
the trial when he has not excepted to it. Fralich v. The People, 659.
11. Upon a writ of error the court has no power to hear a motion for a new
trial. Id.
12. Such a motion must be in the Oyer and Terminer. Id.
13. Where the defendant dies after verdict while the case is before the
bench on exceptions, judgment may be entered nunc pro tunc. .Blaisdell v.
Harris, 662.
14. Instructions which cover the whole case should be so framed as to meet
the points raised by the evidence and pleadings on both sides. Fitzgerald v.
RFfayward, 771.
15. The statutes of Missouri, authorizing the courts to refer issues of fact
to a referee in certain cases, are directory only and not mandatory. Id.
16. When the charter of a city authorizes suits to be commenced against
it by the service of process upon. the mayor, the courts of the United States
are bound since the Act of Congress of June 1st 1872, to conform to the same
manner of service. Perkins v. City of Watertown, 777.
17. State laws when adopted by Congress become obligatory on the Federal
courts. Id.
18. Service on the mayor elect before acceptance or qualification, is not
a service on the mayor of the city. Id.
19. Where there is no mayor nor acting mayor, service on the city clerk
and city treasurer is not sufficient. Id.
20. Courts must administer the law as they find it, and not supply defects
in legislation when a difficult or hard case presents itself. .d.
PROCESS. See OFzcIC AND OFFICER, 12.
RAILROAD. See CORPORATION, 9; NEGLIGENCE, 1; PAsSENGER, 1.
1. A railway company must exercise ordinary care and diligence in run-
ning their trains over a public street, either in law or in fact, with reference
to all persons rightfully on the street. K. P. R. W. Co. v. Pointer, 63.
2. In an action against a railway company plaintiff may show the nature
and extent of his injuries, his sufferings, the length of time he was disabled,
the value of his time, and his expenses in being cured, and the effect his in-
juries will have upon him in the future. Id.
3. The prospective effect may be shown by the opinion of a surgeon. Id.
4. Plaintiff cannot prove his pecuniary or social condition so as to enhance
the damages. Id.
5. The servants of a railroad company may remove a passenger who refuses
to pay his fare. Chicago R. I 4- P. B. R. Co. v. Herring, 196.
6. If the passenger offers a paper as a pass it is his duty on being informed
that it is not a pass, to pay his fare or leave the train at the first station. Id.
7. If the servants of the company use more force than is necessary to re-
move a passenger the company are liable. Id.
8. If the passenger is wilfully and negligently injured, the jury may give
exemplary damages, and an itstruction to do so is not error. Id.
9. Railroad companies are incorporated by authority of law, not for the
promotion of mere private ends, but in view of the public good they subserve.
Marsh v. F. P. 6- N. W. Railway Co., 390.
10. The specific execution of a contract in equity, is a matter not of abso-
lute right, but of sound discretion in the court, and in deciding whether spe-
cific performance should be enforced against a railway company, regard must
be had to the interests of the public. .1d.
11. The location of the depot has much to do with the accommodation of the
public, and a court of equity will not compel a railroad company to perma-
nently locate its depot at a particular spot, in order to subserve the private
advantage of an individual. .d.
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12. A railroad company must fence when the streets of a town terminate
at its track, and if it does not, it is liable for injury to cattle, without regard
to the negligence of the owner. T. IV. 4- JV. Railray Co. v. Cary, 534.
13. Where animals escape from their pasture, through defect of fences,
which it is the duty of a railway company to maintain, and thereafter come
upon the track and are killed by a passing train, the company will be held
responsible to the owner. Gilman v. Railroad Co., 555.
14. And the fact that the animals, after !their first escape, wandered over
other intervening land of their owner, and finally came upon the track across
the land of another landowner, and by reason of there being no fence between
the track and the river, which the company had omitted to build, by reason
of a contract to that effect with the owner of the land, will not excuse the
company. Tile loss is sufficiently the natural result of the defendant's negli-
gence, in omitting to build a proper fence upon plaintiff's land, to render the
defendant responsible. Id.
15. It is the duty of railroad companies to use upon their trains all im-
provements in machinery, or in construction of cars commonly used by other
companies, and failure to do so is negligence for which they are liable. Cos-
tello v. S. 6- B. Railroad Co., 666.
16. If they are obliged to have some brake, the public safety requires that
it should be the best in use. 1d.
17. Railroad companies must run at such a moderate rate of speed through
cities that by the use of brakes the train may be speedily stopped. Id.
18. It is erroneous to charge the jury that a child who is sui juris is bound
to exercise the same degree of caution in crossing a track as an adult. Id.
19. In an action against a railroad company by an administrator of one of
its employees, the sole question is, was the defendant guilty of negligence in
employing an incompetent person as conductor on the train on which the de-
cedent was killed. Haskin, Adm'r, v. N. '. C. R. R. Co., 666.
20. Raising to the post of conductor a person who has served seven years
in the inferior station of car-coupler, is not of itself proof of negligence.
Id.
21. It being impossible for a company to move its trains when being made
up according to a time-table, the omission to provide regulations for such
movements is not negligence. Id.
22. One who enters into the employ of a company with full knowledge that
no provision has been made for protecting its servants, has no claim to recover
damages for injuries resulting front the want of such provisions. Id.
23. A railroad company is responsible for injury done by fire under the
Code of Maryland, whether the same is caused by sparks or by coals thrown
from the engine by its employees. B. 4- 0. R. R. Co. v. Dorsey, 735.
24. It is the duty of a street railway company to provide vehicles which
insure security to their passengers, and not to stiffer them to occupy unsafe
places upon such vehicles. East Saginaw St. Railway v. Bohn, 745.
25. 'If this duty is neglected and a passenger is injured, he cannot recover
damages of tile company if his own neglect of the duty of self-preservation
contributed to the injury. id.
26. But duty can only be predicated of one who has capacity to under-
stand and ability to perform it. Therefore, a child not of an age or discretion
to understand the danger in riding upon the front platform of a street car,
cannot be charged with negligence in so doing. Id.
27. Parents have a right to assume that street railway companies furnish
conveyances which are reasonably safe, and have regulations which preclude
persons riding in unsafe places upon them. They cannot, therefore, be
charged with negligence in permitting their ohildren to ride on tile street cars
without escort if the company consent so to receive them. Id.
28. While a street railway company would not be liahle to a person of
suitable discretion who, being warned of the danger in riding upon the front
platform of the car, should persist in doing so, yet in the case of a person
lacking such discretion, and to whom consequently negligence could not be
imputed, it would be the duty of the company not t) stop with a warning, but
to compel such person to occupy the proper place in the car. Id.
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29. A child four and a half years of age took a street car with his brother
eight years older, and both sat down on the front platform with their feet on
the step. The conductor took the fare and says he told the boys to go into the
car; *but this was denied. There was no other interference with their
riding there. The younger boy in some way not explained got off the car
when in motion, and was run over. Held:
1. That the parent was not guilty of negligence in permitting the children
to take the cars alone.
2. That negligence was not imputable to the younger boy.
3. That it was not imputable to the older boy unless he was of an age and
discretion to understand the danger, and also the difficulty of protecting both
himself and his brother against it.
4. That negligence was imputable to the railway company in permitting
the boys thus to ride. East Saginaw St. Railway v. Bohn, 745.
REAL ESTATE. See CORPORATION, 5 ; PA tTERSHIP, 19, 22.
1. Assertion of title by the possessor of land is an important circumstance
indicating adverse possession and ouster of the real owner, and the absence
of such assertion may be an important circumstance indicating that the pos-
session is not adverse. But the question of ouster must depend upon all ,he
circumstances of the case, and it is not essential that the possessor should
hold the land claiming it as his own. Such claim of ownership is not, as
matter of law, an indispensable element of adverse possession. Johnson v.
Gorham, 271.
2. Where one has the right to use land for certain purposes his occupation
must be presumed primd facie to be in accordance with his legal right. Mows
v. S:evens, 666.
RECEIPT. See ESTOPPEL, 5. EVIDENCE, 26.
1. A receipt for money though stated to be in full, may be contradicted by
paro evidence. Howard et al. v. Norton, 667.
2. A receipt for the note of a third person is explainable, unless it is stated
that it is in full payment of the debt on which it is to be applied, when it will
be considered as an accord and satisfaction. Id.
RECEIVER. See BANK AND BANKER, 4.
1. No action lies by a receiver against the assignee under an assignment
for benefit of creditors, for failure to perform his duty. La Follett v. Akin,
406.
2. The fact that a receiver has been discharged is no answer to a motion
for leave to bring an action against him for property which he sold after notice
of plaintiff's claims. Mfiller v. Loeb, 599.
3. Where after suit brought by the attorneys of a bank on a mortgage, a
receiver of the bank is appointed, the attorneys have no right of set-off against
the proceeds for their services. The Bowling Green Savinqs Bank v. Todd
etal., 599.
RECORD. See DEED, 3, 7 ; EVIDENCE, 1, 41.
1. The clerk of a court has ex officio no right to complete, alter or amend
the record of his predecessor. Rockland Water Co. v. Pillsbury, 668.
2. If there is a failure to make a record of a judgment, it must be done
by petition to the court. Id.
3. Records of a town which holds land as a private corporation unless ac-
companied by possession are not admissible to prove title. South Hampton v.
Fowler, 669.
RELEASE. See PAYMENT, 5.
A voluntary release of an easement by an administrator does not bind the
estate nor the heirs. Mowe v. Stevens, 660.
REPLEVIN.
1. The plea of property in a replevin suit, puts the plaintiff on proof of
pioperty in himself, and any evidence tending to show he is not the owner is
legitimate. Constantine v. Foster, 197.
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2. Where the averment of ownership by the plaintiff is traversed, he is put
on proof of title against the world. Constantine v. Foster, 197.
3. Under such an issue the defendant may prove property in a third person.
Id.
4. Where the verdict is for the plaintiff and it does not appear that he has
already the possessionP, the judgment should be in the alternative, for the pos-
session of the articles or their value. Ward v. .1asterson, 535.
5. Where the verdict is partly for the plaintiff and partly for the defend-
ant, and it does not appear that defendant's possession has been disturbed, the
defendant is entitled to no judgment. .Id.
6. Judgment cannot be entered for a greater sum than is stated in the pe-
tition. Id.
RES ADJUDIOATA. See PLEADING, 15.
1. A judgment between the same parties is not a bar, unless tl.e iormer
suit was identically for the same cause of action. Afiller v. lcManus, 323.
2. A plea of a former recovery, is not sustained by the record of a judg-
ment on an agreement of a different date. Id.
RIPARIAN OWNER. See RIVER, 3.
1. Under United States laws the title of a riparian owner on a navigable
stream stops at the edue, but he has the right to erect wharves and censtruct
suitable landings. IlVsconsin Imp. Co. v. 1yons, 195.
2. Where it is held that the title of a purchaser extends to the centre of a
stream, it is subject to the public right of navigation. rd.
3. The public have all rights on the bank of a stream necessary to navigation.
Id.
4. Land formed by alluvion on the bank of a river, is divisible among the
riparian owners. Batchelder v. Keniston, 326.
5. Rule for appointment among the owners. Ia.
6. The owner of land in Vermont bordering on Lake Champlain has no
title below low-water mark except by statute, which gives him tile right to
build a wharf or dock in front of his land. Therefore this wharf was not
a building on plaintiff's land, nor an accretion to it in the legal sense ; it
was a mere abutting against it by a structure built outside of it. Austin v.
Rutland R. R. Co., 415.
7. A riparian proprietor on the Mississippi, although he be the owner of
s : w-'_ill thereon , has no rigrht witlout legislative muthority, to erect a solid
pier of masonry within the navigable channel of the river, in order to fasten
thereto a boom for the protection of logs ; and such a pier comes within the
egal notion of a nuisance. N. TV. Packet Co. v. Atlee, 561.
8. The respondent held to be in fault for failing to keep such a pier lighted
at night, in consequence of which the libellant's vessel was sunk and her
cargo injured. Id.
9. Extent of riparian rights on the Mississippi river considered. Id.
RIVER.,
1. The legislature can prohibit the erection of any dam or bridge over a navi.
gable stream, which might impede navigation. Wisconsin imp. Co. v. Lyons,
195.
2. By the constitution of the state of Wisconsin, and the compacts and or-
dinances between it and the United States, the Mississippi river, the navigable
waters leading into it, and the St. Lawrence are declared to be common
highways, and for ever free. Id.
3. The soil of the aleus of a river in which there is no tide, belongs to the
riparian owners usque ad medium filum aquo. L'Yonvay Plains Co. v. Bradley,
535.
4. A party complaining of encroachment on the alreus of a stream must
prove essential damage. Id.
5. No priority of use of water, affects the right of a riparian proprietor
a)ove, to a reasonable use of the water by him. Id.
6. The rights of the public for the navigation of the Schuylkill river are
superior to thoie of the city of Philadelphia under the Act of April 9th 1807.
City of Philadelphia v. Gilmartin, 790.
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7. The right of the city to draw water for purposes of manufacturing is
subordinate to the right of navigation. City of Philadelphia v. Gilmartin, 790.
SALE.
1. Where the terms are "cash on delivery," the vendor may hold a lieu
on the property sold until the price is paid. Jenness v. Wendell, 57.
2. Where stock is sold under an agreement by vendor to take it back and
return price if requested and a certificate is delivered, vendor may recover
price without tendering certificate. George v. Braden, 406.
3. Where a sale is made by a referee appointed by the court in an action
to set aside a deed fraudulent as to creditors, no title passes to the purchaser,
by reason of total want of power in the court to order sale. Dawley v. Brown,
668.
4. On a sale for cash the title does not pass until payment and no debt is
created which can be attached. Paul v. Reed, 668.
5. If anything remains to be done by either party to a contract of sale,
before delivery, the title does not pass. Gibbs v. Benjamin, 791.
6. The contract must be executed to effect a complete sale. Id.
SET-OFF. See ATTORNEY. 1 ; BROKER, 8 ; PARTNERSHIP, 23 ; REoEIvER, 3
VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 12.
SHERIFF. See COURTS, 4.1 1. If the defendant in a bastardy suit escapes, and judgment is recovered
against the sheriff for the escape, he cannot be retaken and imprisoned. E.e
parte Voltz, 660.
2. Though a writ be irregular, if the court has jurisdiction it will be a pro-
tection to the sheriff serving it. Fall Creek Coal Co. v. Smith, 735.
3. The sheriff is bound to serve, without inquiring into the regularity of the
writ. Id.
4. If process be inherently without efficacy, it is void as to all persons. Id.
SHERIFF'S SALE. See EQUITY, 28; EXECUTION, 8.
SHIPPING. See LEGAL TENDER, 1.
1. A steamship navigating a channel which is not the ordinary one for
vessels of her size, is bound to exercise more than usual caution. The Java,
118.
2. Where every precaution has been exercised she will not be responsible
for a collision. Id.
3. A bill of lading silent as to the place of stowage, imports that it is to be
under deck. The Delaware, 126.
4. Parol evidence that it was to be on deck is inadmissible. Id.
5. The contract between the ship and the shi1.per is that which is contained
in the bill of lading delivered to the shipper. The Thames, 197.
6. By issuing a bill stipulating for a delivery of the goods to order, the ship
is bound to deliver to no one who has not the order of the shipper. Id.
7. Even if the consignee or endorsee cannot be found the carrier has no
right to deliver to a stranger. Id.
8. The endorsee may libel a vessel for failure to delivwr the goods though
he is but an agent or trustee of the goods. Id.
9. Consignees must provide such reasonable dock-room as their business
ordinarily requires, and for failure to do so they are liable to damages in the
nature of demurrage, whether so contracted in the bill of lading or not. Ful-
ton v. Blake, 779.
10. A consignee who has provided sufficient dock-room for vessels consigned
to him as they usually arrive, is not at fault when from causes over which he
has no control they all arrive together. He is not obliged to procure other
docks; his vessels arriving out of the time when they ought reasonably to
have been expected must await their turn at his docks. Id.
11. By the custom of the port of Chicago one day is allowed the consignee
to provide a dock, and this custom, unless rendered unreasonable by controlling
circumstances, should be considered a part of the contract. Id.
12. The Chicago fire was such an intervention of unforeseen eircumstunces
as excuse delay in persons whose business facilities were disarranged. rd.
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SLANDER.
1. The plea of justification in an action of slander, not having been ze
strictcd as to time, the proof should not be. Stowell v. Beaqle, 262.
2. It is improper to admit evidence of a prior difficulty between the defend-
ant and the father of the plaintiff, as it does not prove actual malice. Id.
3. In actions of slander, where the words charged impute crime, and the
defendant pleads the truth in justification, he must prove the actual offence
charged-that is, be must prove the same matters or facts that would be requi-
site to convict the plaintiff on trial upon indictment for the crime. Ellis v.
Buzzell, 426.
4. But it is not necessary to prove the facts to the exclusion of all reason-
able doubt as in criminal cases. It is sufficient if the defendant leaves a fair
preponderance in the minds of the jury in !his favor notwithstanding the
plaintiff's evidence and the presumption of innocence. Id.
SLAVE. See IUSBAND AND WIFE, 1.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See EQUITY, 29 ; RAILROAD, 10; VENDOR
AND PURCHASER, 9.
A vendor may obtain specific performance of a contract for the sale of land,
although he may be unable to convey the full amount bargained for, provided
it is not too considerable in amount. Foley v. Crow, 729.
STAMP.
1. The Acts of Congress requiring certain instruments of writing to be
stamped before being used in evidence, apply to the use of such instruments
in all courts, both state and national. Chartiers Turnpike Co. v. Budge,
157.
2. By the Acts of Congress, an instrument of writing not properly stamped
is prohibited from being used as evidence, either in a state or a Federal court.
Id.
3. Such prohibition, for the purpose of enforcing payment of the tax, is
within the power of Congress, though it indirectly affects the rules of evidence
in state courts. Id.
4. The power of collectors under the Act of July 14th 1870, to post-stamp
instruments and remit the penalties, applies to notes issued before the act as
.well as those issued subsequently. Pugh v. l'cCormick, 198.
5. An endorsement of a note need not be stamped. id.
6. Nor a waiver by an endorsee of demand of payment and notice of dis-
honor. Id.
b'IATUTES. See INSURANCE, 7 ; PRACTICE, 15.
1. It is the duty of courts in interpreting statutes to ascertain the natural
anml probhle intent of the legislature, if the words are free fro)m ao'biguity,
by giving them their natural import, and where their meaning is doubtful,
to look at extrinsic circumstances. The People v. Schoonmaker, 64.
2. The word ; ' residents"' in a statute ordinarily means an individual and
not a corporation. Id.
3. Inchoate rights derived under a statute are lost by its repeal. Richard-
son v. Pulrer, 126.
4. Statutes are generally to be construed so as not to include the state or
affect its rights unless it is specially named, or it is clear that it was intended
to Ie included. State of Missouri v. Abernatl y, 251.
5. Although the general rule in the construction of statutes, in cases where
the state is a party to the suit, is as above stated, yet under the Homestead
Act of Missouri exempting certain property from execution, a :iomestead ac-
quired belbre the right of action accrued to the state, and not exceeding the
statutory exemption, is exempt from execution issued in favor of the state,
it being incluled by implication in the act, and the intention so to include
the state, being apparent from analogous legislation. Al.
6. Retrospective statutes unless they impair the obligation of contracts are
not fornstden by the Constitution. The People, ex rel. Pitts, v. Supervisors of
Ulster. 263.
7. Remedial statutes are retrospective provided they do not disturb absolute
vested rights. Id.
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S. The Act of 1871, relating to the supervisors of any county in New
York, was prospective only. The People, ex rel. Pitts, v. Supervisors of Ulster,
963.
9. Remedial statutes which do not impair contracts nor disturb absolute
vested rights, may be retroactive in their effect without being unconstitutional.
Tn re Kirkland, Chase 4- Co., 300.
10. An act regulating the disposal of a part of the public funds of thle
state, previously regulated by general laws, is a public act, of which the courts
will take judicial notice. State-ex rel. Foght v. Iloeflinger, 469.
11. An act repealing a public or general law is also a public or general
law. Id.
12. Whatever is given by statute may be taken away by statute, except
vested rights acquired under it. Id.
13. Section 1. of Gen. Stat. 998 of Kansas preserves all rights and remedies
under a repealed statute when the repealing statute is silent on the subject.
Boyle v. State of Kansas, 595.
STOCK. See EQUITY, 3, 9 ; WILL, 1.
STOCKHOLDER. See COnPORATION, 4, 10, 22, 25.
In a manufacturing company, knowing that the capital stock has not been
wholly subscribed, and who is privy to the contracting of a debt, is individu-
ally liable. Hager v. Cleveland, 188.
STREAM. See STREETS, 6.
1. Where lots are sold on streets terminating upon a navigable stream, the
streets will be considered as dedicated to the public down to low-water mark,
unless there is an express reservation of the flats. Stetson v. Bangor, 668.
2. The conversion of a way dedicated to the use of purchasers of lots ad-
joining a public way, does not authorize the award of more than nominal
damages. Id
STREETS. See ESTOPPEL, 11 ; HIGHWAY, 9, 12; INJuNcTIoN, 6; MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION, 2; STREAM, 1.
1. Where contracts for paving city streets are required by law to be let to
the lowest bidder, the purpose is to secure such competition as the nature of
the case will admit; and something is necessarily left to the discretion of the
city council in determining what course will best accomplish that end. May
v. City of Detroit, 149.
2. It is not illegal under such a law to call for proposals for the putting
down of the various kinds of wood and stone pavement, thus putting them in
competition with each other ; and then when the proposals are in, select for
putting down the kind for which the most satisfactory bide, all things con-
sidered, are received. rd.
3. But when the kind is thus selected the lowest bidder therefor has an
absolute right to a contract. Id.
4. A city has full control over the grade of its streets. City of Aurora v.
Reed, 194.
5. But it cannot exercise that dominion to the injury of another's property
in a way that would render an individual liable in damages, without becoming
itself responsible. Id.
5. If in fixing the grade it turns a stream of water on the property of a
citizen it is liahle in damages. Id.
7. It is no defence that the citizen might have dry ditches, he was under no
legal obligation to do so, and the city was. Id.
8. An act of the legislature granting to a passenger railroad company the
right to extend its tracks over certain additional streets in the city of New
York, provided for compensation to the city for ", the value of the rights and
privileges granted." The commissioners reported that the company .hould
pay annually 2 per cent. of the gross receipts for travel on the new tracks,
which being calculated by the proportion such new tracks bore in length to the
whole line was fixed at 33-10Otbs of I per cent. on the whole gross receipts
for travel. In re Second Avenue Railroad, 448.
9. The nature of property in streets, the nature and value ot the franchise
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conferred on a passenger railroad by allowing it to lay tracks in streets, and
the principles by which the value of such franchise may be determined, dis-
cussed. In re Second Avenue Railroad, 448.
SUBROGATION. See BANK AND BANKER, 8; MORTGAGE, 3.
SUMMONS. See AK!ENDMENT, 3 ; PRACTICE, 16.
SUNDAY. See ESTOPPEL, 9.
In an action against a carrier to recover damages for injuries happening to
a passenger, it is no defence that the accident occurred on Sunday. Carroll
v. Staten Island R. R. Co., 668.
,JURETY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 14; USURY, 2.
1. False and fraudulent representations made to the surety at the time of
the execution of a bond of indemnity, constitute a good defence to an action
against tile surety. Fishburn v. Jones, 535.
2. A surety who has been discharged by an extension of time, given with-
out his knowledge, does not become liable by accepting an indemnity against
his liability, nor by afterwards surrendering such indemnity. Rittenhouse v.
Kemp, 600.
3. The failure of the selectmen to examine the accounts of a town treasu-
urer as directed by the statutes of Maine, will not affect the liability of the
sureties on his bond. Farinington v. Stanley, 669.
4. Nor will the surety be released, if failing to detect an error, the select.
men certify his account as correct. Id.
5. A surety who has been discharged by failure to pursue the principal,
and afterwardis makes a promise to pay, upon obtaining certain money, only
becomes liable upon fulfilment of condition. Funk v. Frankenfield, 735.
6. "I hereby become security of C. for the fullilment of the within obliga-
tion," is an original undertaking, and the party making it may be held with-
out proving diligence in pursuing C. Aslton v. Bayard, 792.
7. The dictum that the contract stated in Gilbert v. Henck, 6 Casey 205,
was a guaranty, overruled. Id.
rAXATION.
1. A tax deed which does not show that the land was sold for delinquent
taxes is void upon its face. Hubbard v. Johnon, 126.
2. The legislature of the state has no power to pass a law authorizing a
town to raise money either by taxation or issuing its bonds, and loan the same
to private parties, if enable them to erect mills and manufactories in such
town, thereby to increase its we.lth and business, as well as the accottmoda-
tion of its inh."hitant. Such an object is entirely a private one, and in no
sense entitled w be called a public use of such a character as to justify the
imposition of taxes upon tie inhabitants and, property of & town by the vote
of the maj,,rity of such town. Allen v. lnhabitants o Jay, 481.
3. The minority of the inhabitants in such case may lawfully demanl for
their protection, the interpoition of this court by way of injtction. ld.
4. Under the Statute of 1869 of New llmpshire all deposits and accumu-
lations in savings banks, are to be taxed. Rockinghan, Ten Cents Saving Bank
v. J'ortsnouth, 535.
5. Real estate purchased with the accumulations and deposits is not subject
to taxation as real estate, where it is located. Id.
6. It is a fundamental principle, that the same property shall not be liable
to a double tax in the hands of the same party. Id.
tENANT IN COMMON. See PARTNERSHIP, 7.
1. A tenant in common wrongfully excluded by his co-tenant from pos-
session of the common property may ordinarily maintain ejectinent for his
interest. Austin v. Rutland IR. R. Co., 415.
2. One moiety of land was held by a railroad company in fee and the other
moiety by a tenant for life. The railroad company acquired the life estate
and thien'built its road over the land. After tme expiration of the life estate
the reinainder-man brought ejectment to recover pousession of the land jointly
with the company. Hleld, that the action would not lie. Id.
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3. The building of the road by the company while it had the exclusive right
of possession was a lawful use of its own property and could not be changed
into an unlawful ouster of the plaintiff by his subsequently accrued right of
joint possession. The circumstances of such a case take it out of the ordinary
rule, and the plaintiff is remitted to his statutory remedy for damages. Austin
v. Rutland R. R. Co., 415.
4. The lot was on the shore of Lake Champlain. During the time of the
railroad company's exclusive possession it built a wharf out into the lake
beyond low-water mark. Held, that plaintiffs had no right or interest in this
wharf, and it must be excluded in assessing the value of their estate in the
lot. .d.
TENDER. See BROKER, 7 ; COSTS, 6.
1. By the strict rules of law a tender of performance, as incident to the
legal duty to perform, could not anciently be made after the day fixed for per-
formance and befbre suit brought. Studwell v. Cooke, 223.
2. A different rule was adopted early in this state, Tracy v. Strong, 2 Conn.
659, and a tender may be made here at any time after the breach, and before
the commencement of the action. Id.
TICKET. See PASSENGER, 1, 2.
TIME. See TRUST AND TR.USTEE, 25; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 15.
1. Where a contract is to be performed on a certain day, an unqualified re-
fusal of performance, during any part of that day, is a breach, and the other
party may recover his damages. JMfountjoy v. Metzger, 442.
2. Suit for the breach, commenced on the same day but after the refusal to
perform, is not premature. Id.
3. In a contract which stipulates that certain work is to be performed within
a fixed time, a refusal to comply with the terms to be deemed an abandonment
and forfeiture of all rights under it, the time is of the essence of the contract.
Fitzgerald v. Hayward, 771.
4. On a failure to comply with the terms, the party damnified has a right to
employ others to perform the work, and will not be held responsible for the
profit the contractor might have made. Id.
TITLE. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 8 ; ESTOPPEr,, 2; TowN, 1.
1. A complaint under 29th see. of chap. 141 of Statutes of Wisconsin, to
remove cloud upon title, should state facts showing invalidity of defendant's
claim, and plaintiff's liability to injury. Wals v. Grosvenor, 471.
2. The action cannot be maintained except by one in actual and visible pos-
session of the premises. Id.
3. An averment that plaintiff is the owner in fee simple and in possession
is sufficient. Id.
TOWN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 10; HIGHWAY, 5, 13.
1. The charter of incorporation of a town gives no title to the land in the
town to the municipal body. South Hampton v. Fowler, 669.
2. Votes of a town in possession of land, showing a claim of title are ad-
missible, but where there is no evidence of possession they are not. Id.
TRESPASS. See EQUITY, 21.
1. In an action of trespass fot an alleged injury to the plaintiff's -wall by
inserting joists into it, evidence by the defendant that the wall was so used
by him in the erection of an adjoining building under an express parol agree-
ment with the plaintiff, is not admissible under the general issue plea, in bar
or the action, but is admissible in mitigation of damages. Hamilton v. Win-
dolf, 206.
2 Parol proof of a license specially pleaded to an action of trespass, is
admissible in bar of the right to recover. Id.
3. An abuse of authority given by law makes a party a trespasser ab initio.
Sterling v. W1arden, 669.
4. In trespass on real estate an averment of consequential injury to personal
property, is only matter of aggravation. Loeb v. 31atids, 670.
5. A bill of particulars reading I. B. to L. T. S. to timber taken from the
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S. W. 8, T. 12, R. 22, discloses an action on an account, and not one for
trespass on real estate. J3ernestine v. Smith, 726.
6. Will not lie by vendee for the asportation and conversion of property
not in the possession of the vendor at the time of the sale. Wilson v. ;vii-
son, 736.
TROVER. See ATTACHMENT, 3.
1. )efendant cannot prove in mitigation of damages that plaintiff has re-
gained possession of property. Sprague v. McKinzie, 126.
2. Plaintiff is entitled to recover the actual damages he has sustained in
being deprived of the property. Id.
3. In trover by the payor of a note for $35 against the payee, a judgment
for the plaintiff for one cent damages, does not entitle the payee to enforce
the collection of the note. Dearth v. Spencer, 670.
4. Where stage horses are delivered to a person to be kept at an agreed
price, there is an implied agreement to redeliver them For uqe. and a refusal
so to do is a tort, and conversion of the horses. Hudson v. NVute, 736.
5. A party who has furnished the wheels apd axles to a stage coach, for
one who hought it upon condition that it should remain the vendor's until
paid for, may nevertheless maintain trover for them against a subsequent
purchaser of the coach. Clark v. lVells, 736.
6. Plaintiff sold defendant a wagon for $120, to be his until paid for, the
wagon was subsequently stolen, while $60 remained unpaid, in trover the de-
fendant is liable for full value of wagon and cannot discharge himself by
showing loss without his fault. Duncan v. Stone, 792.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See BAILMENT, 2; MORTGAGE, 44.
1. It is not so much the terms used, as the object to be effeeted, which de-
termines whether an estate is a trust or an executed use. Hawkins v. Chap-
auan, 57.
2. A trust unaccompanied with a beneficial interest descends to the heir ac
common law. Id.
3. No trust concerning real estate can be created in Kansas unless by
writing. Klnaggs v. 1astin, 127.
4. A cestai que trust is entitled to have the interest on the fund paid yearly,
-without deduction for commissions until they are settled by the court. Lathrop
v. Sualley, 198.
5. A trustee who uses the trust fund in his business must seek the cestut
que trust to pay the interest. Id.
6. A trustee who violates the trust is not entitled to commission. Id.
7. A trustee who retains the interest must pay on it from the day it was
due. Id.
8. A trustee will not be removed for every violation of duty, but if lie acts
in had fith lie should be. Id.
9. Vexatious and troublesome conduct is good ground for removing a
trustee.. M'.
10. The trust fund should be invested in hrd and mortgage at the highest
rate of interest allowed by law, and free of taxes, if such exemption exists.
Id.
11. Where an insolvent advances money to his wife or her father, they being
ignorant of his insolvency, and upon learning it pay back in full, there is ne
trust created for creditors in the profits accrued from the advance. ) 'heeler
v. Kirtland, 320.
12. A trust results by operation of law where one purchases land and takes
the conveyance in the name of another. Id.
13. If title be taken in the name of a wife or child it will be held an ad-
vancement or settlement and no trust will rcult. Id.
14. But if it is done to defraud or delay creditors, the land will be liable to
tnis debts. Id.
15. Where the party advancing the money knows that the title is to be
mude to tie grantee for his own henefit, no resulting trust can arise. Md.
16. Where a wile purchases for her own benefit, though the husband ad-
vance the money as a gift, no trust is created for creditors. Id.
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17. Where part of the purchase-money is paid by the party to whom the
conveyance is made, no trust results to one adv'ancing the residue. Wheeler
v. Kirtland, 320.
18. A resulting trust cannot be raised from subsequent matter arising ex
post facto. Tunnard v. Littell, 327.
19. It is no defence to a note given to a township trustee, that the con-
sideration was township funds and that the plaintiff had vacated his office.
Rock et al. v. Stinger, 406.
20. Where a third party pays the purchase-money of lands and the grantor
agrees to hold them in trust for its repayment, such trust will take priority of
a judgment against the grantee. Milliken v. Ham, 407.
21. An implied trust cannot be created by parol. .d.
22. A purchase by a trustee at his own sale, either directly or indirectly,
will be set aside on application of the parties really interested. Smith v.
Drake, 471.
23. Courts of equity will refuse relief even in cases of breach of trust,
where there is laches or unreasonable delay on the part of those concerned.
Id.
24. Such relief is always granted on equitable terms. Id.
25. The time which constitutes laches depends upon circumstances. Id.
26. If a cestui que trust be induced by fraud to discharge the trust, it is ex-
tinguished so far as an innocent purchaser is concerned. Penobscot Railroad
Co. v. Mayo, 670.
27. If a person whose own note is deposited in trust for others, obtain pos.
session of it without the consent of the cestnis que trust, it may be enforced
against him in the name of the depositary, by those entitled. Id.
28. Investment of trust funds in trustee's individual name is concealment.
Norris's Appeal, 787.
29. If trustee speculates with trust funds he may be held to account for
profits if successful, to interest if disastrous. Id.
30. Where trust funds can be traced to any investment, the cestui que trust
may claim it. "d.
31. Cestui que trust may select the most profitable investments, where they
have been made partly with trust funds and partly with trustee's private funds,
and cannot be discriminated. Id.
USAGE.
1. Proof of usage is admitted in actions on express contracts on the ground
that it explains the intent of the parties. Lamb v. Klaus, 199.
2. Usage should be long-continued, well established and uniformly acted
on. d.
3. It is unnecessary to show how long a usage has continued if it is shown
that the parties knew it and contracted in reference to it. 7d.
4. A usage to pay ten per cent. on advances on goods is not contrary to the
terms of a written contract where nothing is said of interest. rd.
5. Such usage is like any other unwritten promise to pay that rate and is
good to enforce payment of interest at the legal rate. Id.
USURY. See PLEADING, 6.
1. Where a note draws interest until paid at highest legal rate an agreement
to pay additional sum for extension is usurious. Meiswinkle v. McCullough,
127.
2. While the agreement is executory, it is void and does not discharge a
surety. Id.
3. Even if excess is paid, the promise to extend being without considera-
tion is void, and surety is not discharged. Id.
4. Usury laws are intended to protect the borrower, and not to prevent the
lender from receiving an excess from third parties, who voluntarily agree to
pay it. AfcArthur v. Schenck, 127.
5. Where the maker and endorser of a note reside in New York and it is
drawn and payable there the laws of that state govern as to the rate of in-
terest. Hackettstown Nat. Bank v. Rea, 600.
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6. If it is discounted in New Jersey at seven per cent. it is not rendered
usurious and void, because the legal rate there is six per cent. Hackettstown
Nat. Bank v. Rea, 600.
VARIANCE. See AssusPSIT, 8, 9; PLEADING, 5.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Of Real Estate.
1. A vendor cannot insist upon a forfeiture of the money paid on a con-
tract, although the vendee has failed to come up to the time stipulated, where
he is unable to perform his part on account of encumbrances. Mallace v.
McLaughlin, 263.
2. A vendor cannot declare a forfeiture unless he is in a position at the
time to compel specific performance. Id.
3. Encumbrances on the land, is sufficient defence for failure to make pay-
ments at times stipulated. Id.
4. Where vendor falsely represents that his title is good and free fro'n en-
cumbrance, vendee cannot be held to be in default in making payments until
encumbrance is removed. Id.
5. Where purchaser refuses to receive the deed or pay for the land the
vendor may either keep it or sell it, and if he sells he need not consult the
purchaser in relation thereto. Griswold v. Sabin: 328.
6. If party seeking specific performance claims allowance on the ground
of want of title to part, he must show a title out of the defendant. Davit v.
.Pierrepont, 328.
7. If a third party is in possession under the defendant at the time of agree-
ment, the title is presumed in defendant until contrary is positively proved.
Id.
8. Allowance will be refused, where the contract shows that the defendant's
interest was that of landlord or reversioner. 41.
9. Specific performance will not be decreed where it is against equity under
the circumstances. Id.
10. The gross neglect of a complainant in paying the principal and in-
terest, and his laches for nineteen years, would deprive him of the right to
performance. 1d.
I. Ignorance of an encumbrance, or of a defect not appearing on the face
of the title, is immaterial, in a suit against the vendee for purchase-money
Peck et al. v. Jones, 408.
12. Vendee cannot defalk from the purchase-money the value of a public
road opened through the land. .d.
13. Where there is a covenant to convey "1 free of all encumbrances," the
covenantee may rightfully refttse a doubtful title. Leggett v. The Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 408.
14. Where a vendee seeks to rescind a contract on the ground of fraud, he
must return the property within a reasonable time, and in such a way, as to
place thb vendor in substantially the same condition. .Manahan v. Nqyes,
670.
15. Whether four days is a reasonable time is a question of fact and not
of law. Id.
16. W. bought certain silver-mines, upon the representation that they
would yield a certain amount, the contract to be void if W. should not approve
the report of a selected assayer ; after the report lie paid a large part of the
purchase-money, but they not being up to the representations, he refused to
pay the rest: Held, that he was liable. Weist v. Grant, 792.
17. Having acted upon assayer's report, and there being no collusion or
fraud, he was estopped from alleging misrepresentation in the contract. Id.
If. Of Personal Property. See SALE, 2.
18. On a sale of logs, if the agreement is, that the title shall pass when
they are deposited in a certain place, it will so pass, though the vendor is still
required to scale them. Morrow v. Reed, 194.
19. Where a party agrees to take an article on trial, to pay the price if it
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suits, otherwise to return it, and he fails to return it, the vendor may treat it
as an absolute sale, and recover the contract price. Spickler v. Marsh, 200.
20. Where the agreement is that the title to certain logs shall pass wher
they are deposited in a certain place, if the verdor deposits them in such place.
the title passes, whether he intended to deliver them then or not. Morrow v.
Campbell, 200.
1 21. An article sold, is at thq risk of the buyer as soon as the contract'of
-ale is perfected. Prescott v. Locke, 262.
22. The rule that the sale is not perfected until the" goods are counted or
'weighed holds not only when the sale is of a certain quantity to be taken from
a larger bulk, but where it is of the entire quantity provided it is at so much
ner pound or number. Id.
23. The delivery and acceptance must be unequivocal to satisfy the require-
ments of the Statute of Frauds. Id.
24. To constitute delivery nothing must remain to be done to the property
by either party. 1d.
25. The purchase of property from one in possession but who has no au-
thority to sell, will not change the title, unless the purchaser is a bond fide
one without notice, and a purchase by a firm of which one member has notice,
is not bond fide. Ruchman v. Decker, 469.
26. Where upon a sale of chattels anything remains to be done, no title
passes to the vendee. Walrath v. Ingles, 600.
VENUE.
Where a suit is removed from one county to another, the venue should be
laid in the county where the suit was instituted. Countv Commissioners v.
Gibson, 264.
VERDICT. See NEw TRIAL, 2.
Where two suits are consolidated into one, the jury may render one ver-
dict, and a failure to make an objection in the lower court, will be deemed a
waiver even if there was an objection. Miller v. Mc'anis, 328.
VESSEL. See ADMInALTY, 3; MECHANICS AND MATERIAL-MIEN, 1, 6.
VOTE. See ConPORATiON, 21.
WARRANTY. See COVENANT, 2.
1. Where warranty is conditional it must be strictly followed as to the con-
dition. Smith v. Boist, 200.
2. Representations constituting a warranty, and charged to be false, must
have been made during the negotiations for the sale. Shull v. Ostrander,
264.
3. A warranty must be made during the treaty of sale, or at least before
the performance of the substantial terms thereof. Id.
4. Opening a highway is not such an eviction as will entitle a vendee to
an action for breach of covenant. Peck et al. v. Johnes, 407.
5. A defect or encumbrance not known to vendee when he accepts the deed,
is a defence to a bond for the purchase-money, though there is a general war-
ranty. Id.
WAY. See EASEMENT, 2.
1. Where a conveyance contained "ca right of passage-way over an adjoin-
ing lot," any passage-way which is reasonably suitable for the purpose will
be deemed to answer the call in the deed, and any use which was substantially
in accordance with the grant, will be held to have been under it and not ad-
verse. Smith v. Wiggin, 671.
2. Fox conveyed a lot of ground with a passage over his "1 remaining
ground," without defining the passage, and subsequently conveyed the vacant
part of his land with warranty, opening a passage through his house, which
the vendee of the first lot used twice, held, that Fox and his heirs were bound
by this location. Kraut's Appeal, 736.
3. Though the construction of the grant might be that the vacant part was
intended for the passage, the limits might be defined by subsequent use and
acquiescence. I _d.
848 INDEX.
WHARF. See RIPARIAN OwNER, 6; TENANT III COMMON, 4.
WILL. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 3; COURTS, 11.
1. Testator by his will authorized his executors at their discretion to sell
his real estate, and then directed them '' to convert into money all the rest of
his estate not already in money or securities, and invest the same securely at
interest" for the support of his four children. The will further provided
that if tile testator's son J. G. married the dauglter of A. J. C. before a
certain time, such son should take no part or share in his estate, either prin-
cipal or interest, and any provision made for him is upon this condition.
There was no residuary clause in the will.
The son married a daughter of A. J. 0. before the time mentioned. On
bill filed to settle the construction of the will, held,
(I.) That as to the proceeds arising from the sale of the real estate, and as
to the money and other securities the testator died intestate, neither being in-
eluded in the clause directing the executors to invest part of his estate for the
benefit of the children, and there being no bequest or devise of any residue.
(2.) That shares in the capital stock of corporations must be sold by the
executors, such shares being neither money nor securities.
(3.) That the restraint in regard to marriage was certain as to the individual,
and being a legal and valid condition made void all bequests to the son.
4. That tie son was not entitled to claim any part of his father's estate,
not even that as to which lie died intestate. Grayidon's Executors v. Graydon
et al., 391.
2. The reason that the marriage of a woman revokes her will made before
marriage, is because she is disabled by coverture to dispose of the property
in the will, and it ceases to be ambulatory. iltorton v. Onion, 403.
3. Where a considerable portion of the property disposed of by such a
will, remains in her, unaffected upon her death, by any marital right of her
surviving husband, the will may be proved. Id.
(4.) Where there are reasonable grounds for believing fraud in obtaining a
will, and no steps are taken for five years to set it aside, it is gross laches.
Holden v. Meadowos, 471.
5. Testator whose memory and mental faculties had become almost wholly
obliterated by softening of the brain, cannot be regarded as of testamentary
.capacity. Id.
6. Neither age nor weakness of intellect are sufficient to incapacitate a
perpon from making a will. Crolias v. Stark et al., 472.
7. An influence in procuring a will which nay be lawful when exercised
by a wife, may he illegitimate and undue if exercised by a womat living in
unlawful intercourse with testator. Kessing'r et al. v. Aessinger el al., 671.
WITNESS. See ELECTION, 1 ; EVIDENCE, 18; iusnAND AND WIFE, 29.
1. Tite petitioning nephews and nieces of an intestate are not incompetent,
under tie Act of 1868 of Maryland. Jones v. Jones, 192.
2. Where an attesting witness has signed his name to an instrument with-
out tile onsent of tite parties, the instrument may be proved as if there was
no attesting witness. Sherwood v. Pratt, 255.
3. The signature of a subscribing witness is not conclusive, it is only
primdfiicie evidence that he was called in by the parties, and may be contra
dicted. Id.
4. And for this purpose, parol testimony may he received. Id.
5. It is not necessary that a witness in speaking of value of a thing,
should only speak from obervation, lie may be made acquainted with its con-
dition by the testimony of others, and then testify, if lie is conversant with
property of that nature. Orr v. Mayor of iNe't, Yorl, 403.
6. The statute of Indiana has not changed the rule that hu-band and wife
are incompetent witnesses for or against each other. Stanley v. Stanton, 408.
7. Interest or bias does nut disqualify a witness. Arend v. Lireepool, New
York Steamship Co., 408.
8. Under tile Statutes of New Hampshire neither interest nor infamy is any
Jisqualification as a witness. Clenments v. Marston, 536.
9. Nor is a husband or wife excluded from testifying for or against one
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another, unless the testimony would lead to a violation of marital confidence.
Clements v. Mfarston, 536.
10. Conversations between a husband and third persons overheard by the
wife, would not ordinarily come within this exception. Id.
11. And a wife who acts as her husband's agent in a matter requiring no
special confidence, may state the facts she learned in the course of the agency.
.7d.
12. A prisoner who takes the stand as a witness in his own behalf, can be
contradicted the same as any other witness. Fralich v. The People, 659.
13. It is competent to show that his testimony as to being unconscious of
what he did while committing the crime is not true. Id.
14. A wife is a witness as to the physical condition of her husband after
an injury, and his statements of sufferingpain involve no violation of marital
confidence. Stack v. Portsmouth, 662.
15. A witness is only allowed to detail facts and not mere opinions not
based on facts. Rtzgerald v Hayward, 771.
16. The maker of a note is a competent witness for the endorsee in a suit
against executrix of the endorser, to prove that the testator agreed to pay the
same at maturity, being at the time indebted to the maker. Scdey, Executrix,
v. Merritt, 784.
WRIT. See SHExiaF, 2, 3, 4.
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